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Community benefits agreements (CBAs) are hailed by land use reform 
advocates as an effective, flexible, inclusive tool for making land use 
decision-making processes more responsive to traditionally underserved 
communities. Using the power of community organizing to gain leverage 
over developers as they navigate zoning and other regulatory 
chokepoints, CBAs allow traditionally disorganized residents and 
businesses to extract benefits and conditions directly from developers.  
This value capture process, reformists argue, helps reduce the negative 
impact of diffuse economic and social externalities that either cannot or 
will not be mitigated by the traditional land use regulatory apparatus.   
 
The reformist narrative, however, fails to account for the overriding 
strength of one particular subset of participating interest groups—that of 
organized labor—in leading the charge for community benefits.  Those 
interests, this paper argues, often wield disproportionate power in the 
informal negotiations underlying the formation of a CBA, and have 
structured CBAs so as to avoid the preemptive effects of federal labor 
law.    In so doing, labor’s preeminent interests may undermine the very 
goals of efficiency, inclusion, and equity in distribution of developers’ 
rents that CBAs purport to advance. 
 
This paper evaluates this claim by telling the story of one particular deal 
in New Haven: a CBA negotiated in advance of a public land sale to an 
independent charter school management organization.   By analyzing the 
deal against both the historical development of CBAs and the normative 
criteria against which scholars have evaluated other land use controls, 
this paper aims to shed light on whether the structural incentives built 
into CBAs may underserve interests that the existing regulatory regime is 
designed to protect. 
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Figure 1 - Martin Luther King Elementary School in 2012 prior to its demolition.   




For over 40 years, the Martin Luther King Elementary School sat on a flat, 5.6 
acre plot of land on the West side of Dixwell Avenue in New Haven’s Newhallville 
neighborhood.1  Squat and rectangular, the school was but one example of the 
functionalist preference in 1960s school design, the unbroken lines of a solid brick façade 
interrupted only by a thick rainbow stripe upon which black and white portraits of 
historic black leaders are framed by circles of fading white paint.  
Originally constructed in 1968,2 but unoccupied for years, the school has been 
called an “eyesore” by Brenda Foskey-Cyrus,3 one of Newhallville’s two alderwomen, 
                                                
1 Melissa Bailey, City Plans To Sell MLK School To Amistad, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (June 15, 2012). 
2 See CITY OF NEW HAVEN, CITY PLAN COMMISSION ADVISORY REPORT RE: 580 DIXWELL AVENUE (Oct. 
17, 2012). 
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taking its place alongside numerous other shuttered public and commercial institutions 
along the main avenue of the once-vibrant “Harlem of New Haven.”4  Gone is the Q-
House community center, a mere half mile south on Dixwell avenue from the MLK 
school.5  Gone, too, is Bob’s Market, a formerly vibrant marketplace and community 
gathering point, which stood less than two blocks from MLK’s front doors but closed in 
the 1980s.6  Newhallville’s grand avenue, instead, has become an epicenter of violence in 
the city.  Crime data from 2000-2009 shows Newhallville suffered the largest absolute 
number of violent crimes during that period, and ranked seventh out of New Haven’s 29 
census tracts for violent crime per capita.7 
Well over ten years ago, the City of New Haven viewed school construction 
projects as one critical method of promoting neighborhood revitalization, singling out 
several schools in Newhallville along the Dixwell Avenue corridor for renovation or 
demolition and new construction.8  A decade later in 2012, another school revitalization 
opportunity was presented to the neighborhood in the form of Achievement First—a not-
for-profit, New Haven-based charter school network.  Seeking to alleviate space 
constraints and improve the facilities of its Amistad High School in the Hill 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Bailey, supra note 1. 
4 Elizabeth Mills Brown, NEW HAVEN, A GUIDE TO ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN DESIGN 169 (1976). 
5 Q-House closed its doors in 2003 following a declaration of chapter 7 bankruptcy.  See Mary E. O’Leary, 
Q House Buyout Plan Gives Group a Chance, New Haven Register (June 2, 2009). 
6 Wayne E. Travers Jr., The Golden Days of Dixwell: For a Half Century, African-American Business Was 
Centered in the Neighborhood, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Feb. 7, 1999, at D 1. 
7 MARIO GARCIA, NEW HAVEN PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT, CREATING A HEALTHY AND SAFE CITY: THE 
IMPACT OF VIOLENCE IN NEW HAVEN app. 4 at 2 (2011).  The data show that during the 2000-2009 period, 
1,412 violent crimes were reported in Newhallville, which maps onto only one census tract (1415).  Id.  
Although other neighborhoods such as The Hill and Fair Haven revealed greater incidence of violent crime 
in total, those neighborhoods comprised multiple census tracts.  Id. 
8 See CITY OF NEW HAVEN, CITY PLAN DEPARTMENT, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, SECTION IV-HOUSING AND 
NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING at 15-16 (2002).  The plan specifically identifies Newhallville’s Jackie 
Robinson school and Lincoln-Basset schools—both a stones’ throw from 580 Dixwell Avenue—as key 
targets for revitalization, noting that “[a]s a city of neighborhoods, each residential area has distinct 
qualities that form a foundation for redevelopment.  In particular, the school construction program provides 
an unparalleled opportunity to link neighborhood revitalization with the public school system.”  Id. 
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neighborhood across town, Achievement First saw promise in constructing a new school 
on the City-owned plot where MLK then stood.  A new facility at 580 Dixwell would 
meet the needs of its growing student body while maintaining the school’s ties to 
underserved, economically-depressed neighborhoods within New Haven’s borders.  Now, 
at the end of 2013, the MLK school has been reduced to a pile of rubble, to be replaced 
shortly with a brand new, independently-owned and operated $35-million high school 
that will serve 550 students: the new, improved, Amistad Academy, funded entirely by 
state grants and private donations.9 
But the road to redevelopment for Amistad Academy was not free of speed 
bumps.  And the deceptively simple act of buying the parcel at 580 Dixwell revealed a 
host of treacherous political and legislative shoals, each of which threatened to scuttle the 
deal from the outset unless Achievement First was willing to relinquish substantial 
control over not only its use of the land, but also the way in which it chose to operate its 
own school.   
The negotiations that ultimately allowed Achievement First to build at 580 
Dixwell tell a complex story of influence politics in which a particular subset of interest 
groups used community-organizing power to influence local government regulatory 
decisions and gain concessions from the developer.  This process underscores the 
ascendant authority of organized labor in New Haven and highlights the waning influence 
of the once-dominant political force of the Dixwell clergy.  More significantly, the 
outcome of the negotiations, crystalizing into one of New Haven’s most recent iteration 
of a community benefits agreement (CBA), offers lessons that illustrate both the potential 
benefits and tangible downsides of informal land use power-brokerage—negotiations 
                                                
9 See discussion infra Part III. 
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which technically take place outside the narrow confines of “formal” land use regulatory 
processes, but which nevertheless control both the means and the ends of local land use 
debates.  
 This paper sets out to tell the story of the negotiations surrounding the sale of 580 
Dixwell.  And in so doing it aims to describe and critique the emerging complexities 
surrounding the use of CBAs, both in New Haven and elsewhere across the country.  
Community groups have increasingly promoted the use of CBAs as a tool to force 
developers to internalize negative externalities that are not accounted for in local land use 
decision processes.  Yet the current literature (and the cases studied therein) fail to 
accurately describe the CBA as a tool intentionally created by, and structured specifically 
to be useful for, a particular special interest: organized labor.10  Furthermore, the 
literature fails to evaluate the appropriateness of CBAs against the context of specific 
variables particular to a given land use decision—such as the type of land use action at 
issue and the identities of the parties in interest.  Thus, while CBAs may yield clear 
advantages for communities seeking to make commercial redevelopment decisions more 
responsive to local needs, CBAs may also result in deleterious consequences, such as 
under protecting interests traditionally served by land use controls, or making more costly 
the provision of public or quasi-public goods.  
                                                
10 The majority of the literature surrounding CBAs depicts organized labor as merely one group among 
many potential interest groups, including environmentalists, religious groups, housing advocates, anti-
poverty advocates, and low-income residential and commercial neighbors.  See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin & 
Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice and 
Other Considerations for Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J. ENV. L. 
& POL’Y 291, 305 (2008).  One scholar, Benjamin Sachs, has recognized CBAs as one of several tools that 
labor may rely on to undertake what he describes as “tripartite lawmaking,” allowing labor interests to gain 
leverage and influence labor policy without running afoul of federal labor laws.  See discussion infra Part 
IV.C.II; infra note 132.  Sachs analyzes the CBA from the perspective of what role it can play in crafting 
labor law at the local level.  Although Sachs describes some of the collateral risks associated with this 
private ordering—as occurs with CBAs—his analysis is circumscribed, reserving for future study how 
severe these risks might be.  This paper uses Sachs’ analysis to show that CBAs are structured peculiarly 
with labor interests in mind.  See discussion infra part IV.C.  
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In addition, because CBAs are negotiated in the shadow of government, free from 
the strictures of mandatory public oversight, important questions of transparency and 
representation must be addressed.  Unions’ intentional strategy of using CBAs to evade 
the strictures of a highly preclusive federal labor law regime, for instance, raises the 
specter that unions’ advantages in community organizing may overwhelm a process 
aimed at resolving local issues—not because labor has any vested interest in the land-
related impacts of the development itself, but because the process serves the instrumental 
end of circumventing federal law.  The prevalence of labor interests that infused the 
Newhallvile CBA negotiation reflects the muscular political power of new union-
affiliated politicians in New Haven, and perhaps suggests a need for enhanced scrutiny 
when the boundaries between private negotiations and public approval processes begin to 
dissolve.  
 The paper proceeds in five parts.  Part I describes community benefit agreements 
generally and provides a historical account of their emergence, situating the CBA as one 
tool designed to serve the objectives of a progressive urban movement.  Part II portrays 
the rise of CBAs within New Haven, set against the shifting dynamics of political power 
as it transferred from machine politicians to an emergent class of labor-backed 
legislators.  Part III tells the story of the CBA negotiated as part of the City of New 
Haven’s sale of the Martin Luther King school to Achievement First.  Part IV undertakes 
a normative evaluation of this particular CBA, offering observations applicable to the use 




Figure 2 - Plot of 580 Dixwell Avenue, New Haven, CT 
Source: City of New Haven Bd. of Aldermen, Aldermanic Ward Maps (2012).   
 
I. INCOME INEQUALITY, THE NEW ACCOUNTABLE DEVELOPMENT 
MOVEMENT, AND THE EMERGENCE OF COMMUNITY BENEFITS 
AGREEMENTS 
 
 The history of contemporary, progressive economic advocacy movements helps 
elucidate the redistributive impulses underlying community benefits agreements.  
Situating the emergence of CBAs within this broader movement helps identify the social 
and economic forces that prompted this innovation, and reveals the CBA as less of a tool 
 9 
designed to re-shape land use regulation than as one of several tactic aimed at achieving 
broader social and economic outcomes.      
 
A. Income Inequality and the Accountable Development Movement 
 
Localized income inequality is a modern fact of life in Connecticut.  Once one of 
the most egalitarian states in the country (in terms of income distribution), over the past 
thirty years Connecticut is now at the leading edge of income disparity in the United 
States,11 despite the fact that Connecticut’s per capita income is one of the highest in the 
United States.12 By reference to the Gini coefficient, which provides a rough measure of 
the inequality of income distribution, Connecticut is second only to New York as the 
most unequal state, based on 2011 census estimates.13  A joint study by the Connecticut 
Voices for Children and Connecticut Association for Human Services reports that, over 
the past thirty years, Connecticut’s income disparity has increased at a rate faster than 
any other state in the country.14   
 Within New Haven, wealth and income inequality are pervasive and tangible at 
the neighborhood level.15  The city comprises a veritable hodge-podge of higher, middle, 
                                                
11 Wade Gibson & Sarah Kauffman, Connecticut Voices for Children & Connecticut Association for 
Human Services, Pulling Apart: Connecticut Income Inequality 1977 to Present (Nov. 2012) available at 
http://www.ctvoices.org/sites/default/files/econ12pullingapart.pdf. 
12 See Bettina H. Aten et. al, Real Personal Income and Regional Price Parities for States and Metropolitan 
Areas 2007-2011, in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, SURVEY OF 
CURRENT BUSINESS 91 (2013).  Part of the disparity may be attributable to the rise of New York City 
commuter communities along the “gold coast” of southern Connecticut, such as Greenwich, Stamford, 
Westport and New Canaan, as well with the growing investment industry situated outside of Wall Street. 
See Osman Kilic, Quinnipiac University School of Business, Alternative Investment Institute, State of 
Connecticut and the Hedge Fund Industry (2013); Kenneth R. Gosselin, Gold Coast Slips But Maintains 
Huge National Wealth Lead, HARTFORD COURANT (Aug. 9, 2010). 
13 Gibson & Kauffman, supra note 11 at 7.  
14 Id. at 8.  
15 Income inequality in New Haven is by no means a modern phenomenon; rich and poor neighborhoods 
within the city have existed for centuries.  For instance, Floyd Shumway and Richard Hegel contrast the 
aristocratic quality of Hillhouse Avenue with the working class neighborhoods that sprung up around the 
Orange Street axis.  See, e.g., Floyd Shumway & Richard Hegel, New Haven in 1884, 30 J. NEW HAVEN 
COL. HIST. SOC’Y 1 (No. 2, Winter 1984).  New Haven historian and urban scholar Douglas Rae also 
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and lower income neighborhoods,16 reflecting a national trend of urban disequilibrium 
that has varyingly been attributed to the effects of a globalized economy on urban 
environments, increasing stratification of income returns among high- and low-skilled 
workforces, and the attraction of unskilled immigrant workforce to urban economies.17  
Wealth disparity in Connecticut writ large is highly correlated with the demographic 
profiles of state residents,18 and income disparity among white and minority families in 
New Haven appears to follows this trend.19  
 Although academics and policymakers tend to agree that national economic 
inequality has the potential to yield deleterious effects,20 some disagreement remains 
                                                                                                                                            
describes the distribution of low-wage workers in New Haven during the early twentieth century.  See 
DOUGLAS W. RAE, CITY: URBANISM AND ITS END 120-27 (2003). 
16 Neighborhoods classified as high income include East Rock, East Shore, Prospect Hill, and Westville. 
Low income neighborhoods include Dixwell, Dwight, FairHaven, Hill, Newhallville, West River, and West 
Rock.  See COMMUNITY FOUNDATION FOR GREATER NEW HAVEN, UNDERSTANDING THE GREATER NEW 
HAVEN REGION THROUGH DATA 14, 15, 24 (2012). 
17 See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, The Global City: Introducing a Concept, Brown Journal of World Affairs 38 
(Winter/Spring 2005); Edward Glaeser et al., Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, 
Taubman Center for State and Local Government, Urban Inequality 1 (March 2009).  In Connecticut 
specifically, economists and policy advocates have also focused on the effects of substantial losses in the 
manufacturing sector from the 1990s until today, as well as growth in the entrepreneurial sector—such as 
hedge funds and private equity firms.  See Rob Varnon, Connecticut Income Disparity Grows, 
CTPOST.COM (Nov. 15, 2012).  
18 See Joachim Hero, Connecticut Family Asset and Opportunity Scorecard, Connecticut Voices for 
Children (2009).  The Scorecard evaluated the median net worth of households as the sum attributable to 
any individual older than 15, less liabilities.  Id. at 3 n.3.  Assets included financial assets as well as equity 
in real property.  Id.  Hero reports that the median overall net worth of Connecticut households in 2009 was 
$147,266—well above the national median of $88,803.  However, the median does not capture the 
substantial disparity between white-headed households (reported at a median net worth of $195,771) and 
minority-headed households (reported as $3,000).  Id.  
19 See Urban Apartheid: A Report on the Status Of Minority Affairs in the Greater New Haven Area 10, 
NAACP, Greater New Haven Branch (March, 2013).  The NAACP report provides longitudinal family 
incomes disaggregated by race, with median incomes in 2009-2011 for white, black, and Hispanic families 
at $77,443; $37,547; and $29,400 respectively. 
20 See, e.g., Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in The United States, 1913-1998, 118 Q. 
J. ECON. 1 (2003) (observing the dramatic widening of income disparity in the United States over the 
course of the twentieth century); Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? 84 
AM. ECON. REV. 600, 607 (1994) (theorizing that highly stratified economies correlate with slow economic 
growth because these countries tend to seek redistribution of wealth through progressive tax structures, 
thereby increasing tax rates and disincentivizing investment); Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distributive 
Politics and Economic Growth, 109 Q. J. ECON. 465, 481 (1994) (finding that countries with high income 
inequality have, conversely, lower investment in capital). 
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regarding the effects of localized inequality.21  Nevertheless, many progressive advocates 
reject a pure wealth-maximizing approach to economics, and view income inequality 
(whether local or national) as unambiguously harmful, advocating a range of social 
policies to equalize wealth and reduce the gap between rich and poor.22  While academics 
have noted the challenges associated with redistributive economic policies at the local 
level—namely, that the ease of migration of both individuals and firms in local 
economies (i.e, suburban flight and “mobile capital”) places practical limits on local 
governments attempting to implement redistributive or progressive policies23— 
reformists have continued to seek out both formal and informal tools that help reduce the 
income gap in local communities.24  
 Although the American anti-poverty movement has existed since at least the 
1960s,25 a new wave of activism began in the 1990s to address poverty through wage 
reforms.  Beginning with a grassroots campaign to pass a living wage bill in Baltimore, 
                                                
21 See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23 (2010); Clayton 
P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
1057, 1058 (2007); Kristin Forbes, A Reassessment of the Relationship Between Inequality and Growth, 90 
AM. ECON. REV. 869 (2000); Glaeser, supra note 17 at 7 (describing studies suggesting that local income 
inequality might benefit the poor by offering good employers, strong role-models, or encouraging the 
wealthy to contribute more to low income causes as a result of geographic proximity).  
22 See, e.g., About Us, UNITED FOR A FAIR ECONOMY, http://faireconomy.org/about_ufe; Areas of Research, 
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, http://www.epi.org/research/inequality-and-poverty/; Inequality and the 
Common Good, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, http://www.ips-dc.org/inequality; Background and 
History, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, http://ctj.org/about/background.php.  
23 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 1–18 (2001) (arguing that because 
homeowners allocate votes based on the value of their homes, local officials advocate policies that 
maximize social welfare at the local level) ; Glaeser, supra note 17 at 8-9; Richard C. Schragger, Mobile 
Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482 (2009).  But see 
Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. 
REV. 831, 867 (1992) (describing municipalities’ willingness to impose inefficient exactions despite inter-
municipal competition). 
24 See Richard Schragger, Reviving Urban Liberalism, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 901, 916, 925 (2013) 
(describing local ordinances that create effective bans on big box retailers as one mechanism of shifting 
power to low wage earners); Resources, PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES, 
http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/resources/tools (listing tools that advocacy groups have used to develop 
“strong and equitable urban economies”).  
25 See, e.g., ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT FOR 1964 14 (declaring a “War on Poverty”). 
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Maryland in 1994, a broad coalition of union locals, church congregations, affordable 
housing advocates, and other progressive nonprofits began a targeted campaign of 
economic and social justice reforms at the local level.26  Eschewing the glacial pace of 
federal or international policy changes, and decidedly pessimistic about the prospects of 
achieving reform through collective bargaining,27 activists leveraged networks of 
community organizers and grassroots groups to initiate a nation-wide movement of 
localized change—all designed to secure greater opportunities, amenities, and subsidies 
for local, low-income residents and employers.28   
 Particular areas of local politics proved receptive to these advocacy efforts—
specifically, advocacy aimed at leveraging the power of local government as an 
instrument for regulating private capital and the workers employed thereby.29  One of the 
more salient tools for achieving this goal—the community benefits agreement (CBA)—
has recently emerged as a favored tool used by advocates to achieve site- or employer-
specific redistributive policies in local communities.  Coupling redistributive economic 
policy objectives with a reformist vision for more participatory local redevelopment 
politics, the “New Accountable Development Movement” has led the charge in 
promoting the use of CBAs to achieve two primary goals: (1) achieving the equitable 
                                                
26 See Chris Tilly, Living wage laws in the United States: The dynamics of a growing movement, in 
THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN CONTENTIOUS POLITICS at 143-44, 150-53 (Maria Kousis & Charles Tilly, 
eds., 2005); Virginia Parks & Dorian Warren, The Politics and Practice of Economic Justice: Community 
Benefits Agreements as Tactic of the New Accountable Development Movement, 17 J. COMMUNITY PRAC. 
88, 90 (2009). 
27 See, e.g, Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375 (2007) (describing the 
decentralization of labor law due, in part, to the inefficacy of federal labor law and policy); Chris Tilly, 
Living wage laws in the United States: The dynamics of a growing movement, in THREATS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES IN CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (Maria Kousis & Charles Tilly, eds., 2005) (“Crippled by 
employer resistance that rendered the National Labor Relations Act largely ineffective, unions were losing 
most organizing drives… To many, local government appeared to offer the most promising opportunities 
for pro-worker action.”). 
28 See supra note 24. 
29 Katherine V.W. Stone, Globalization and the Middle Class, UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research 
Paper No. 12-16, at 22-23 (September 21, 2012), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150412. 
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redistribution of resources by regulating wages and employment policies on an employer-
by-employer basis; and (2) giving greater voice and influence to marginalized or 
politically disadvantaged community-members in shaping the (re)development 
dialogue—as it pertains to both the economic and physical consequences of a given 
redevelopment project.30  
 
B. Anatomy of a CBA 
 
At its most basic, a CBA is nothing more than a contract, the purpose of which is 
to guarantee local (and vocal) political support for—or a promise not to oppose—a 
developer’s proposed land use plan as it wends its way through the local land use 
regulatory process.31  To one side of the contract sits the developer—typically a large, 
commercial developer, backed by private capital.  To the other sits, in theory, the 
“community”—though in practice this “community” tends to comprise a coalition of 
local grassroots organizations, which is frequently organized by labor-affiliate groups 
with substantial experience in grassroots coalition-building.32  The agreement normally 
contains a set of conditions that the developer will agree to in advance of official 
municipal regulatory decision-points like zoning approvals, land sales, or the allocation 
of municipal subsidies.   
                                                
30 See Parks & Warren, supra note 26 at 89; Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community 
Economic Development in the Figueroa Corridor, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 59, 68 
(2007); Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political Economy of Urban 
Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1999, 2002 (2007); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT (2001). 
31 See Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or Another Variation 
on the Exactions Theme? 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 7  (2010) [hereinafter CBAs]. 
32 In the case of the Newhallville CBA, this organization took the form of the Connecticut Center for a New 
Economy (CCNE).  See discussion infra Part II.   The organization that led the charge for the first recorded 
CBA was the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), see Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, 
supra note 10 at 304-06.  The Atlantic Yards CBA in Brooklyn, NY, was negotiated largely by the New 
York chapter of the now-defunct Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), 
alongside the Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (BUILD) and the Downtown Brooklyn 
Advisory and Oversight Committee (DBAOC).  See Been, supra note 31 at 23. 
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In exchange for these concessions, the community, in turn, agrees to either 
support or eschew opposition for the proposed project.33  Although the public hearing 
processes (and the court of public opinion more broadly) associated with land use 
regulation have almost always offered members of the affected community a chance to 
register their opinion of a given project, the CBA provides strength in numbers.  It 
leverages the power of community organizing to secure a specific set of commitments 
that may or may not be possible to extract by individuals participating as individuals in 
land use processes.34 
 
1. Common Types of Benefits 
 
Although the coalition of interested parties may vary from project to project, a 
relatively common set of conditions appear in many of the most well-documented CBA 
processes.35  One grouping of conditions concerns the hiring and employment policies of 
either the developer’s construction contractors or the businesses arising out of the 
development.  For the permanent businesses, this may include prevailing or living wage 
requirements,36 card check and neutrality agreements,37 mandatory benefits programs,38 
                                                
33 E.g., Been, supra note 31 at 5; Foster & Glick, supra note 30 at 2010. 
34 See Parks & Warren, supra note 26 at 90; Salkin & Lavine, supra note 10 at 295-96. 
35 As an example, Murtaza Baxamusa’s doctoral dissertation groups the benefits that were the subject of the 
Ballpark Village CBA in San Diego into three distinct categories: “Environmental”; “Housing & 
Neighborhood”; and “Economic & Employment.”  MURTAZA HATIM BAXAMUSA, BEYOND THE LIMITS TO 
PLANNING FOR EQUITY: THE EMERGENCE OF COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS AS EMPOWERMENT 
MODELS IN PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES 105 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation).  See also Thomas A. 
Musil, The Sleeping Giant: Community Benefit Agreements and Urban Development, 44 URB. LAW. 827, 
831 (2012) (categorizing four distinct types of “community goals” negotiated in the CBA process).   
36 Gates-Cherokee CBA (Denver, CO); Dearborn Street CBA (Seattle, WA); Ballpark Village CBA (San 
Diego, CA); CIM Project CBA (San Jose, CA).  The Partnership for Working Families website maintains a 
relatively thorough compilation of CBAs currently in effect.  See Policy & Tools: Community Benefits 
Agreements and Policies In Effect, PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES, 
http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/page/policy-tools-community-benefits-agreements-and-policies-effect 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2013).  See also THE PUBLIC LAW CENTER, SUMMARY AND INDEX OF COMMUNITY 
BENEFIT AGREEMENTS (2011) (summarizing the benefits and conditions included in 18 CBAs) [hereinafter: 
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diversity quotas,39 or local hire provisions such as hiring quotas for a particular 
geographic or economically-disadvantaged group.40  The developer’s own contractors 
may also be held to similar requirements, and CBAs have frequently demanded that 
developers comply with state or municipal “responsible contracting” laws and 
ordinances—normally applicable only to public sector contractors—which prohibit 
developers from contracting with businesses that have previously violated public works, 
labor, or occupational health and safety laws.41 
A second set of conditions are analogous to those required for developers to 
secure certain land use approvals or permits—such as bid requirements for city-issued 
RFPs for land sales, impact fees, or concessions granted as part of a conditional zoning 
                                                                                                                                            
SUMMARY OF CBAS].  Unless otherwise noted, all provisions of the CBAs referred to in this section are 
documented on the Partnership for Working Families website. 
37 “Card check” is a method of certifying a union that bypasses the typical secret-ballot election process 
overseen by the National Labor Relations Board.  Under card check, unions rely on union “authoirization” 
cards that an employee signs signaling his or her consent to union representation.  See Paul C. Weiler, 
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1769, 1806 (1983).  Once the union secures a majority of card signatures from the targeted workforce, the 
union is automatically certified.  Id.  Neutrality agreements are commitments by the employer to remain 
neutral during a union organizing campaign.  Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: 
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 821 (2005).  CBAs that have provided some 
form of either or both types of agreements include: Hill District CBA (Pittsburgh, PA); Yale-New Haven 
Hospital CBA (New Haven, CT); Bayview Hunters Point CBA (San Francisco, CA); Sugar House CBA 
(Philadelphia, PA), see SUMMARY OF CBAS supra note 36 at 30.  The neutrality and card check agreement 
was not included as a formal element of the CBA in the case of Yale-New Haven.  See infra note 332.  The 
Dearborn Street CBA (Seattle, WA) also included labor neutrality and card check; but presumably is not 
included on the Partnership for Working Families website as the project went bankrupt.  A copy of the 
document, however, is available at: http://juliangross.net/docs/CBA/Dearborn_Street_Agreement.pdf. 
38 Staples Center CBA (Los Angeles, CA); NoHo Commons CBA (Los Angeles, CA); Lorenzo Project 
CBA (Los Angeles, CA).  
39 LAX Airport CBA (Los Angeles, CA); Newhallville-Amistad CBA (New Haven, CT).  The 
Newhallville-Amistad CBA is detailed in Part III infra.  
40 Hill District CBA (Pittsburgh, PA); Bayview-Hunters Point CBA (San Francisco, CA); Yale New Haven 
CBA (New Haven, CT); Gates-Cherokee CBA (Denver, CO). 
41 Ballpark Village CBA (San Diego, CA); LAX Airport CBA (Los Angeles, CA); Staples Center CBA 
(Los Angeles, CA); NoHo Commons CBA (Los Angeles, CA).  For an example of the application of 
responsible contracting ordinances or laws, see NEW YORK STATE PROCUREMENT BULLETIN, BEST 
PRACTICES FOR DETERMINING VENDOR RESPONSIBILITY 5 (2009)  
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scheme.42  These conditions traditionally address concerns of local residents or area 
businesses that may be affected by a new, large development in the area.  For instance, 
with regards to housing, a CBA may include agreements to provide a set number of 
affordable-, family-, or senior-housing units.43  Alternately, a developer might commit to 
providing permanent, affordable housing in the nearby area to low-income residents 
displaced by the development.44  Local small businesses might also receive set-asides for 
a certain percentage of the resulting retail space,45 or rental subsidies to help defray the 
cost of relocation.46  Additionally, agreements may require commitments from the 
developer to provide—or make good faith efforts to secure—specific amenities or 
community services, such as grocery stores,47 child-care centers,48 parks,49 schools,50 or 
community centers.51  These facilities may be provided directly by the developer, or may 
come in the form of grants or assistance to public entities or local community groups.52  
Additionally, some CBAs have secured benefits that appear identical to those that might 
be required as part of a conditional use permit, such as funds to assist in creating 
                                                
42 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 327-29, 331-36, 627-28 (3d Ed. 
2005); Jeremy Kutner, The Accidental Success of Connecticut’s Largest Housing Development: 360 State 
Street in New Haven 5-7 (unpublished paper, on file with the Yale Law School Legal Scholarship 
repository) (2010). 
43 Almost all CBAs contain such provisions.  E.g., Bayview Hunters Point CBA (San Francisco, CA); 
Gates-Cherokee CBA (Denver, CO); Oak to 9th CBA (Oakland, CA) 
44 Staples Center CBA (Los Angeles, CA). 
45 CIM Project CBA (San Jose, CA); Atlantic Yards CBA (New York, NY). 
46 Dearborn Street CBA (Seattle, WA) (see supra note 37). 
47 Ballpark Village CBA (San Diego, CA); Hill District CBA (Pittsburgh, PA). 
48 CIM Project CBA (San Jose, CA). 
49 Staples Center CBA (Los Angeles, CA); The Gateway Center at Bronx Terminal Market CBA (New 
York, NY) (see SUMMARY OF CBAS supra note 36 at 22). 
50 Atlantic Yards CBA (New York, NY). 
51 Marlton Square CBA (Los Angeles, CA); Dearborn Street CBA (see supra note 37); Minneapolis Digital 
Inclusion CBA (Minneapolis, MN) (see SUMMARY OF CBAS supra note 36 at 19. 
52 Kingsbridge Armory CBA (New York, NY); Yale-New Haven CBA (New Haven, CT); Columbia 
Expansion CBA (New York, NY) (see SUMMARY OF CBAS supra note 36 at 26). 
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additional parking for residents,53 or a commitment of funds to help the city create a 
residential permit parking program.54 
A third set of conditions relate to what I will call “tertiary” or “hook” benefits: 
conditions which neither directly mitigate the effect of a given development on area 
businesses or residence, nor serve the redistributive economic policy goals of wage and 
employment commitments.  These benefits help to broaden the coalition of interest 
groups by sharing value captured by the CBA process to potentially agnostic 
organizations.  
They take a variety of forms, from environmental guarantees that extend beyond 
basic remediation requirements (such as LEED certification for new construction55 or 
other green building requirements,56 limitations on diesel vehicle idling,57 or more 
extensive remediation standards58) to policies aimed at excluding specific types of 
businesses (such as permanent bans on leases to payday lenders and pawn shops).59  
Many CBAs also include cash grants or other financial commitments to support a hodge-
podge of social causes: guaranteeing funding for social outreach coordinators to address 
the problems of asthma and uninsured children,60 contributions to urban youth 
development programs,61 funding for economic impact studies or master planning 
                                                
53 Peninsula Compost Company CBA (Wilmington, DE) (see SUMMARY OF CBAS supra note 36 at 37). 
54 Staples Center CBA (Los Angeles, CA); Hollywood and Highlands CBA (Los Angeles, CA). 
55 Ballpark Village CBA (San Diego, CA); Hill District CBA (Pittsburgh, PA). 
56 LAX Airport CBA (Los Angeles, CA); Atlantic Yards CBA (New York, NY); Harrison Neighborhood 
CBA (Minneapolis, MN) (see SUMMARY OF CBAS supra note 36 at 43). 
57 Ballpark Village CBA (San Diego, CA). 
58 LAX Airport CBA (Los Angeles, CA); SunQuest CBA (Los Angeles, CA); Atlantic Yards CBA (New 
York, NY). 
59 Dearborn Street CBA (Seattle, WA) (see supra note 37). 
60 Yale-New Haven CBA (New Haven, CT). 
61 Yale New Haven CBA (New Haven, CT); Newhallville-Amistad CBA.  See discussion infra Part III. 
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processes,62 or funding to finance neighborhood improvement projects.63  One CBA even 
contained a commitment by the developer not to oppose an anti-formula retail ordinance 
(otherwise known as an anti-big-box or anti-Wal-Mart ordinance).64   
 
2. Public and Private CBAs 
 
CBAs are by definition non-governmental contracts, insofar as the developer is 
one party and an unspecified group of actors—typically a coalition—constitutes the 
other.  These “private” CBAs stand conceptually in contrast with “public” CBAs, which 
one scholar has defined as “community benefits commitments set forth solely in a 
development agreement, but resulting from a broadly inclusive, focused process.”65  This 
binary distinction between “private” and “public” CBAs belies many of the peculiarities 
involved from agreement to agreement, and does not reflect the myriad ways in which 
government may be involved in their formulation.66   
Nevertheless, CBA proponents have broadcast a clear preference for “private” 
CBAs, going so far as to exclude from the definition any agreement that involves 
government ratification.67  The concern with whether the agreement is “public” or 
                                                
62 Hill District CBA (Pittsburgh, PA);  Ballpark Village (San Jose, CA). 
63 Sunquest CBA (Los Angeles, CA). 
64 Dearborn Street CBA (Seattle, WA) (see supra note 37). 
65 Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, and Legal Enforceability, 17 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 35, 45 (2007).  Development agreements are similar to CBAs insofar 
as the developer agrees to offer a series of benefits—often related to public infrastructure—in exchange for 
a commitment from the municipality to (a) provide the requested zoning change, and (b) preserve the status 
quo land use regulations for a pre-set period of time.  See Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements After 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), 22 Urb. Law. 23, 27 (1990).  See generally 
DOUGLAS R. PORTER & LINDELL L. MARSH EDS., DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: PRACTICE, POLICY, AND 
PROSPECTS (1989). 
66 In the case of the Newhallville-Amistad CBA, two members of the New Haven Board of Aldermen were 
included as signatories to the final agreement.  It is not clear, however, whether they signed the agreement 
in their official or individual capacity. 
67 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 65 at 45; David A. Marcello, Community Benefit Agreements: New Vehicle 
for Investment in America's Neighborhoods, 39 URB. LAW. 657, 660-61 (2007) (contrasting CBAs with 
development agreements, which he labels as public-private partnerships, and noting that “CBAs …are 
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“private” stems from three impulses: control over enforcement; concerns about 
voidability based on unconstitutional exactions; and concerns about the preemptive force 
of federal labor law. 
First, proponents advocate for private CBAs as a way to ensure the commitments 
may be enforced by its beneficiaries, rather than relying on the local government to 
police the contours of the document.68   One of the largest organizers of CBAs, the Los 
Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), proposed shifting to a wholly private 
CBA model after noting dissatisfaction with the development agreement model.  Because 
these “public” benefits were negotiated directly between the developer and the city, 
beneficiary groups were unable to resort to court enforcement when the city proved either 
unable or unwilling to satisfactorily enforce the contract.69  Furthermore, as one CBA 
scholar has observed, once the developer clears any regulatory approval processes with 
the support of a community coalition, the coalition’s influence is substantially 
diminished.70  The city’s desire to maintain cooperative relationships with large 
developers, combined with high turnover in both elected and civil service, reduces 
incentives to exact strict enforcement.71  In addition, when beneficiary groups are not 
include as signatories, local governments may have the prerogative to modify the 
development agreement later in time with the consent of the developer, bypassing the 
wishes of the beneficiary groups.72 
                                                                                                                                            
negotiated and executed directly between community representatives and a developer; by contrast, 
community members are frequently nowhere to be found in the bilateral PPP negotiations between a 
developer and a municipal entity.”). 
68 See Gross, supra note 65 at 46. 
69 Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 30 at 319.  
70 Gross, supra note 65 at 47-48. 
71 Id.   
72 See Benjamin S. Beach, Strategies and Lessons from the Los Angeles Community Benefits Experience, 17 
J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 77, 104-05 (2008).  
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Second, CBA advocates remain concerned that public ratification of the 
agreement may render the agreement vulnerable to attack as an unconstitutional 
exaction.73  Although encouraging participation of democratically elected officials may 
bolster the accountability and legitimacy of the negotiation process, by excluding 
government officials entirely, the negotiating coalition may secure a broader range of 
benefits that will not risk triggering constitutional scrutiny.74  
Third, where the negotiations involve labor-related commitments like neutrality 
and card check agreements, the “private” nature of the contract is essential to avoid the 
preemptive force of federal labor law.75  Under federal labor law, district courts are able 
to enforce contracts in which unions and employers agree to specific provisions that 
would otherwise be governed by federal statutes—including agreements by the developer 
to remain neutral during union organizing campaigns, and provisions through which the 
employer will automatically recognize the union (without a secret ballot vote) if the 
union shows that a majority of employees have signed cards agreeing to be represented 
by the union.76  However, these agreements must be private; local government 
                                                
73 See Been, supra note 31 at 27-28.  Been observes that, depending on the specific structure of the CBA 
and the degree of involvement by government officials, CBAs could be declared unconstitutional based on 
the existing constitutional doctrine.  The implications of these doctrines—crystallized in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)—
are discussed in Part IV.B infra.  See infra note 287 and accompany text.  See also Michael L. Nadler, The 
Constitutionality of Community Benefits Agreements: Addressing the Exactions Problem, 43 URB. LAW. 
587, 605 (2011) (proposing that courts use the state action doctrine to determine whether a CBA should be 
shielded from scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan). 
74 See Nadler, supra note 73 at 625 (“communities [face an] unappealing choice between having their 
interests represented by government officials who can be held accountable via the democratic process but 
whose participation will require all of the community benefits to comply with the “essential nexus” and 
“rough proportionality” tests, or excluding such officials from the negotiation process in the hopes that the 
potential for community benefits that would be excluded by Nollan and Dolan outweighs the risks of 
having negotiators who do not answer directly to the community.”). 
75 See discussion infra part IV.C.2. 
76 See, e.g., Hotel & Rest. Employees Union Local 217 v. J.P. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d 561, 565 (2d Cir. 
1993); Georgetown Hotel v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1467, 1470-71 (D.C.Cir.1987). 
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involvement in shaping the rules governing union organizing is precluded by federal 
labor law.77  
These three impulses provide a strong incentive for negotiating coalitions to 
prioritize private agreements over the model envisioned by development agreements and 
similar public-private partnerships. 
 
C. The Emergence of CBAs and the Role of Labor-Related Advocacy  
 
Although most scholars cite the 2001 Los Angeles Staples Center agreement as 
the Magna Carta of the modern CBA movement,78 the innovation of gathering broad 
interest group constituencies to exact promises from large urban employers is not new.  
Beginning in Los Angeles in the 1980s, labor groups devised innovative strategies 
designed to apply pressure outside of the confines of the National Labor Relations Act.79  
One of the first iterations of the modern labor-community alliance—the 
Labor/Community Coalition to Keep GM Van Nuys Open—formed in response to a 
threatened plant shutdown by General Motors in the Van Nuys neighborhood of Los 
Angeles in 1981.80  The United Auto Workers (UAW) Local 645 sought partnerships 
with a variety of grassroots organizations, churches, academics, and activists—
particularly in the Latino community (many of whom worked at the plant)—to express 
vocal opposition to the closing and threaten a boycott if the plans went through.81  The 
initial Coalition solidified into a permanent organization, the Labor/Community Strategy 
                                                
77 See discussion infra Part IV.C.2. 
78 See, e.g., William Ho, Community Benefits Agreements: An Evolution in Public Benefits Negotiation 
Process, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 7, 19-20 (2008); Schragger, supra note 23 at 509. 
79 See Katherine Stone & Scott Cummings, Labor Activism in Local Politics, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW 
277 (GUY DAVIDOV & BRIAN LANGILLE, EDS., 2011).  
80 See ERIC MANN, PLAYBOOK FOR PROGRESSIVES:16 QUALITIES OF THE SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZER (2011). 
81 Id., see also Eric Mann, Radical Social Movements and the Responsibility of Progressive Intellectuals, 
32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 761, 764 (1999). 
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Center (LCSC), which organized events and demonstrations throughout the 1980s to 
maintain pressure on GM, managing to keep the plant open for 10 years longer than the 
closing date announced by GM.82   
The Van Nuys strategy served as a model in the 1990s, when the dwindling 
manufacturing base and increasing tendency of corporations to source cheap labor from 
abroad convinced advocates to re-think the targets of organizing efforts, honing in on 
industries and sectors that were less likely to withdraw from the local economy.83  Two 
leaders within the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union (HERE) helped 
form a new organization called the Tourism Industry Development Council (TIDC)—a 
labor/community coalition that advocated for benefits ranging from employer-specific 
advocacy to lobbying for a municipal living wage ordinance.84  In contrast with the Van 
Nuys strategy of the 1980s, TIDC focused its organizing efforts on so-called “sticky” 
industries—i.e., sectors in which it was difficult, if not impossible, to outsource labor 
inputs or automate work functions: retail stores, hotels, restaurants, hospitals, 
construction, and janitorial services.85  
After changing its name to the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy 
(LAANE) in the late 1990s, the group set its sights on large urban development projects, 
leveraging the influence of its organizing capacity to secure concessions from private 
developers across the city in exchange for support in public permitting processes.  For 
                                                
82 See About Us, THE LABOR/COMMUNITY STRATEGY CENTER, http://www.thestrategycenter.org/ 
about (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).  
83 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Globalization and the Middle Class, UCLA Institute for Research on Labor 
and Employment, Working Paper  (December 2012); Schragger, supra note 23 at 484 (noting that “[w]hile 
potentially painful, plant closings, the movement of manufacturing to the South or overseas, the movement 
of persons out of old, cold cities to new, warm ones, or out of cities into suburbs, are unavoidable 
consequences of relatively open economic markets.”).  
84 Harold Meyerson, L.A. Story: The Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy: A New Model for American 
Liberalism? THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Aug. 6, 2013).  
85 See Stone, Globalization, supra note 83 at 20-21.  
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instance, in exchange for support from its 60-member coalition, LAANE helped 
Universal Studies secure construction and zoning permits before the Los Angeles City 
Council and the County Board of Supervisors.86  In return, LAANE secured an agreement 
that all jobs would comply with the city’s living wage ordinance.87  A similar negotiating 
tactic helped LAANE secure analogous concessions from TrizecHahn Development 
Corporation in its redevelopment of eight and a half acres at the corner of Hollywood 
Boulevard and Highland Avenue.88 
By the time the first “private” CBAs arrived on the scene in 2001, 89 LAANE had 
already developed clear strategies for gaining leverage in land use regulatory controls—
LAANE, would serve as the behind-the-scenes coordinator, generating momentum for 
and organizing grassroots, geographically-specific coalitions that would ultimately serve 
as the lead negotiators with the private developers.  In the case of the Staples Center 
CBA, for instance, LAANE led the process of gathering the lead negotiating coalition.  
Working with HERE Local 11 and another prominent economic justice advocacy 
                                                
86 Harold Meyerson, No Justice, No Growth, L.A. Weekly News (Jul. 15, 1998).  
87 At the time, the Los Angeles living wage ordinance applied only to municipal employees and contractors.  
See LOS ANGELES ADMIN. CODE § 10.37.1 (1998). 
88 See Greg Goldin, Mallywood: Can David Malmuth’s Urban Destination Entertainment Center Save the 
Boulevard? L.A. WEEKLY (Dec. 16, 1998).  Armed with the backing of Los Angeles city councilwoman 
Jackie Goldberg, LAANE proposed compliance with the living wage ordinance for the complex’s security 
and service personnel, a local-source hiring plan, and a neutrality agreement for the on-site hotel, in 
exchange for Goldberg’s support for the project before not only city council meetings, but also zoning 
board hearings. See id.; Laura Wolf-Powers, BUILDING IN GOOD JOBS: LINKING ECONOMIC AND 
WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT WITH REAL-ESTATE LED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 18 (2006).  One observer 
noticed that the developers were pleasantly surprised with the living wage demand as a condition of support 
for their development agreement, noting that it would cost a “relative pittance” in comparison with the 
traditional city-driven concessions of “traffic mitigation, height restrictions, [and] parking.”  See Goldin. 
89 See JULIAN GROSS, GREG LEROY & MADELINE JANIS-APARICIO, GOOD JOBS FIRST AND THE CALIFORNIA 
PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECTS MORE ACCOUNTABLE 29, 40 (2005) [hereinafter GROSS ET AL., MAKING DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECTS MORE ACCOUNTABLE] available at: http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/sites/pwf/files/ 
publications/2005CBAHandbook.pdf.  
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group,90 LAANE built a 30-member coalition, called the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for 
Economic Justice, to oversee negotiations.  
This strategy—of creating issue-specific coalitions—served as the model for new 
organizing efforts in the rest of the country.  And it set the foundation for the emergence 
of CBAs in New Haven when a nascent labor affiliate group, the Connecticut Center for a 
New Economy (CCNE), began—with help from LAANE91—its efforts to organize Yale 
New Haven Hospital.92   The history of CBAs will be discussed in greater depth below.  
But to fully appreciate the merger of community organizing with traditional land use 
regulation, it is important to explore the unique political and legal background of urban 
redevelopment and labor in New Haven.   
 
II. POLITICS AND URBAN LAND USE IN NEW HAVEN 
 
Although CBAs are a phenomenon of recent vintage, the issue of community 
engagement in (and the struggle for control over) urban redevelopment has been a 
longstanding and contentious concern in modern New Haven, sitting at the confluence of 
two major trends in its urban history.  First, the indignities suffered by disempowered 
minority residents, many of whom who were systematically excluded from participation 
in the urban renewal process, led to a rising demand for greater community engagement 
in the politics and policy-making of urban land use, economic development, and poverty 
reduction.93  Second, the rise of Yale as the leading employer of a deindustrializing town 
                                                
90 See Cummings, supra note 30 at 61.  
91 See infra note 136. 
92 Joel Lang, How An Innovative Alliance Forced Yale-new Haven Hospital To Help Its Impoverished 
Neighborhood As Part Of A Plan For A New Cancer Center, THE HARTFORD COURANT (May 21, 2006). 
93 For an excellent account of the rise of community-based resistance to centrally-planned urban 
development in New Haven throughout the 1960s, see MANDI ISAACS JACKSON, MODEL CITY BLUES: 
URBAN SPACE AND ORGANIZED RESISTANCE IN NEW HAVEN (2008).  As of 2012, Jackson was employed as 
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offered a larger target for once-dormant union organizers.  The renewed growth of the 
labor movement in New Haven throughout the 1980s and 1990s was propelled, in part, 
by the expansion of the collective bargaining agenda to include a broader platform of 
activism that incorporated the concerns of non-union employees and local residents.  This 
so-called “social movement unionism”94 resulted not only in resounding wins for the 
labor movement across a range of employment sectors, but also culminated in the 
infusion of labor-backed political candidates into the New Haven Board of Alderman.95  
 
A. Urban Renewal and Its Backlash 
 
Beginning in the 1950s, New Haven experienced a conflation of social and 
economic trends that were in no ways unique in urban centers across the United States: 
deindustrialization;96 white flight (spurred by the expansion of the interstate highway 
system and affordable mortgages for WWII veterans);97 the dilapidation of affordable 
housing stock; and the gradual erosion of the urban center.  The suburban exodus of 
mostly white, middle class urban residents left city centers bereft of economic vitality, 
and urban poverty began to climb precipitously, spawning efforts at the local, state, and 
federal level to identify solutions to the problem of urban decline.  The Housing Act of 
1949, designed to “advance[] the growth, wealth, and security of the Nation,” offered 
federal subsidies to subnational governments to appropriate, demolish, and rebuild 
“slums and blighted areas” in order to make way for the redevelopment of urban 
                                                                                                                                            
a Senior Research Analyst for UNITE HERE.  See Profile, Mandi Jackson, Center for Union Facts, 
http://www.unionfacts.com/employee/UNITE_HERE/MANDI/JACKSON (last visited Dec. 10, 2013). 
94 See, e.g,, Peter Waterford, Social Movement Unionism: A New Union Model for a New World Order, 16-
3 REVIEW 245 (1993); Lowell Turner, An Urban Resurgence of Social Unionism, in LABOR IN THE NEW 
URBAN BATTLEGROUNDS: LOCAL SOLIDARITY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 15 (LOWELL TURNER & DANIEL B. 
CORNFIELD, EDS., 2007). 
95 See Unions “Kick Ass” In Primaries, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Sep. 13, 2011).  
96 RAE, supra note 15 at 361-67.  
97 See id.; EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 171-72 (2011). 
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communities and the expansion of public housing.98  Inevitably, slum clearance involved 
the displacement of large numbers of slum dwellers, most of whom, at the time, were 
non-white.99  Because the statutory grants gave substantial discretion to local authorities 
in deciding where, when, and how to proceed with urban renewal grants, minority 
residents had few opportunities to redress the myriad grievances arising out of 
implementation of federal urban renewal monies.100   
Urban Renewal in New Haven was no exception; to the contrary, under the 
auspices of Mayor Dick Lee, New Haven became the largest per-capita beneficiary of 
federal urban renewal dollars,101 carrying some seven large-scale clearance projects, and, 
in the process, displacing approximately 8,000 households.102  Local citizens, dissatisfied 
with the highly centralized process by which urban renewal projects were undertaken, 
developed new models of grassroots civic participation, aiming to counteract the 
exclusion that engendered wide-spread resistance to New Haven’s urban 
redevelopment.103   
 
B. Union-led Coalition-Building Takes Root 
                                                
98 Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-68 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-69(c) 
(1968). 
99 See Note, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Federal Urban Renewal Projects: A New 
Approach? 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 258, 264 (1969) (citing HARTMAN, THE HOUSING OF RELOCATED FAMILIES, 
IN URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 322, 326 (J. Wilson ed. 1966)) (estimating that 
non-whites made up seventy percent of residents displaced by urban renewal’s slum clearance provisions).  
100 Id. at 265-66.  
101 Norman Fainstein & Susan Fainstein, New Haven: The Limits of the Local State, in 
RESTRUCTURING THE CITY THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT (NORMAN FAINSTEIN Ed., 
1980). 
102 See Douglas Rae et al., Urban Renewal Figures, New Haven 1950s–1960s, HISTORICAL NEW HAVEN 
DIGITAL COLLECTION, YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY (2006), http://www.library.yale.edu/ 
newhavenhistory/documentlist.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2013). 
103 See JACKSON, supra note 93 at 152-60.  The distrust, frustration, and anger arising from socially 
dissociative policies was felt quite acutely in New Haven’s poorest neighborhoods.  The riots in 1967 in 
New Haven’s Hill neighborhood illustrated and magnified this distrust, and underscored the need to shift 
tactics to develop a model of citizen participation that more accurately reflected the social fabric of the 
affected neighborhoods.  Id. at 147-58; 152. 
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Proceeding in parallel, New Haven’s labor movement saw tremendous advantages 
in developing a more diverse, pro-poor coalition of community groups as it struggled to 
renegotiate union contract terms with the city’s largest employer: Yale University.104  
HERE Local 34, representing clerical and technical workers, and Local 35, representing 
service and maintenance workers, had struggled to unionize Yale University workforces 
for decades.105  In 1985, with substantial support from Local 35, Local 34 signed its first 
contract with Yale after a 10-week strike.106  The following year both locals signed 
contracts through joint negotiations.107 
A decade later, Responding to the University’s attempts to reduce wages, cut 
benefits, and roll back union control,108 the Federation of University Employees (which 
included HERE Locals 34 and 35) initiated a strike in 1996, seeking to scuttle the 
University’s aggressive anti-labor proposals, including a commitment to refrain from 
subcontracting out to dining hall employees.109  After ten weeks of strikes, it became 
clear that “striking alone would not win [the] battle,” and that organized labor needed to 
                                                
104 See Rick Wolff, Why Provoke This Strike? Yale and the U. S. Economy, 49 SOCIAL TEXT 21 (1996); 
Rhonda M. Williams & Peggie R. Smith, What Else Do Unions Do? Race And Gender In Local 35, 18 
REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 59 (1990).  
105 Herbert Janick, Yale Blue: Unionization at Yale University, 1931–1985, 28 LABOR HIST. 349, 350 
(1987). 
106 Id. at 367. 
107 Andrea Cole, How Yale Workers Defied Union Busting, DOLLARS & SENSE (Oct. 1998), available at: 
http://dollarsandsense.org/archives/1998/0998cole.html. 
108 See Gordon Lafer, Land and Labor in the Post-Industrial University Town: Remaking Social 
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find allies outside of the narrow class of concerned employees.110  A broader coalition of 
community advocates was needed. 
Yet the historical insularity and racial hierarchies within New Haven’s union 
leadership111 presented a problem as locals 34 and 35 attempted to recruit broader support 
from New Haven residents.   Although New Haven’s labor groups had long organized 
substantial portions of blue-collar workers, union leadership remained predominantly 
white,112 and had failed to forge relationships with the increasingly concentrated minority 
communities of New Haven.113  Faced with the prospect of enduring strikes, one of Local 
34’s emerging organizers, Andrea van den Heever (then Cole), was tasked with building 
alliances between the union locals and grassroots community groups across the city.114  
As a white South African émigré who had, during the 1980s, established herself as a 
bridge-builder during the anti-apartheid movement, van den Heever had garnered trust 
and support from diverse members of New Haven’s minority communities in organizing 
efforts during the 1980s.115  Van den Heever had partially exhausted her social capital 
with New Haven community groups during labor contract renegotiations in 1989 and 
1992, during which she had managed to secure community support, but had, for a variety 
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of reasons (including thin staffing and limited resources within the unions) failed to 
deliver reciprocal committments.116   
During the 1996 strike, van den Heever worked to develop a more robust 
grassroots machine.  Using a computerized mapping program, the unions identified 
union-members’ residences and established neighborhood organizing committees that 
held meetings to draw out the narrative of the effect of a failed contract renegotiation.  By 
asking union members to present their struggles before family, friends, neighbors, 
politicians, and members of the clergy, the locals identified a mechanism to ensure the 
struggles of individual workers resonated in the broader community context.117   
Shifting from an internally focused organizing strategy towards an outward-
facing, popular appeal proved critical.  The union sought to situate employees within 
their neighborhoods and communities,118 drawing strong support from powerful 
ecclesiastical, civic, and political groups such as the local chapter of the NAACP. 119   A 
critical ally in this struggle—and a group that would reappear in a much different posture 
during the Newhallville controversy—was the Greater New Haven Clergy Association, 
led by the well-known and politically powerful Rev. Boise Kimber.  In late November, 
Rev. Kimber released a vitriolic statement condemning Yale’s position;120 in mid-
December, the momentum of the movement against Yale had gone national, culminating 
                                                
116 See Warren & Cohen, supra note 108 at 639-40 (noting that van den Heever encountered resentment due 
to the “absence of the union” during the periods between contract negotiations, and that a job training 
program conceptualized by the union to meet community needs had failed to address the true objectives of 
community-members, which was a jobs pipeline into Yale, which had historically hired few New Haven 
residents).  
117 See id. at 641.  
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 30 
in a 300-person demonstration attended by John Sweeney (then President of the AFL-
CIO), the president of the New Haven NAACP, and the Secretary of the State of 
Connecticut.121  Before the end of the year, negotiations were complete, with Yale 
agreeing to forego its plan to subcontract dining hall employees.122  
Thenceforth, van den Heever’s innovation of building reciprocal labor-
community partnerships would become a centerpiece of labor organizing strategies in 
New Haven.  Drawing on lessons from the 1996 Yale campaign, in 1997 and 1998 van 
den Heever played a key role in organizing community resistance to help enforce a 
neutrality agreement embedded in a development between the City and prominent real 
estate developer David Cordish.123  The success of both campaigns led van den Heever in 
2000 to institutionalize the labor-community partnership model in the form of the 
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Connecticut Center for a New Economy (CCNE),124 which was established as a 
permanent adjunct organization to UNITE-HERE125 local affiliates 34 and 35 in 
downtown New Haven.126  In its mission statement, CCNE broadly aspires to reduce 
income inequality, build power, and combat economic, social, and racial injustice in 
Connecticut;127 however, an article co-written by the chairwoman of CCNE’s board of 
Directors states clearly that CCNE’s primary objective is to reduce income inequality in 
New Haven and, more recently, Hartford.128 
 
C. New Haven’s First Community Benefits Agreement 
 
In 2004, CCNE had the opportunity to merge its unique approach to “social 
movement unionism” with the tactical innovation of CBA emerging out of its “sister 
organization” in Los Angeles, LAANE.129  Six years earlier, District 1199 of the New 
Haven Health Care Employees Union (now part of the SEIU umbrella) had begun a drive 
to organize approximately 1,800 hospital service employees in the Yale-New Haven 
Hospital.130  The union recognition and certification campaign was wholly governed by 
the standard organizing rules prescribed by the NLRA—namely, obtaining the signatures 
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of 30% of the potential workforce, followed by a majority vote for unionization in a 
secret ballot election overseen by the NLRB.131  For years, the organizing campaign had 
simmered between District 1199 and the hospital, turning into a bitter and acrimonious 
fight in the early 2000s.132   
During the early months of 2004, after hearing whispers that the Hospital was 
planning to announce a new major development proposal, CCNE convened a community 
meeting at the Sacred Heart Church in the Hill neighborhood of the city that included 
organizers, church leaders, and labor-backed aldermen.133  CCNE realized it had an 
opportunity to use the city’s forthcoming permitting and zoning processes as leverage in 
its unionization campaign.134  Seeing a chance to organize a showing of community force 
against the hospital—and perhaps at Yale and its expansive land acquisition plans more 
generally—CCNE developed several concrete action plans to build a powerful campaign.  
Immediately after the meeting at the church, the attending alders introduced a non-
binding resolution before the full Board that recognized and recommended community 
benefits agreements as a sound tool for responsible development.135  In late May, CCNE 
flew in a member of LAANE from Los Angeles to make a presentation before the Board 
about the advantages of CBAs.136   The Board passed the resolution several weeks 
thereafter, including language stating that the City would “take [efforts by the developer 
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to create a CBA] into account when considering projects for approval and 
presentation.”137   
In addition, beginning in June and continuing throughout the remainder of the 
year, CCNE began the process of building a cohesive coalition of neighborhood groups.  
Channeling her previous experience with the Omni Hotel and the 1996 Yale strike, van 
den Heever once again focused her efforts on recruiting powerful civic leaders, members 
of the clergy, and civil rights activists—a profile strikingly similar to the coalitions 
formed by HERE in the mid to late 1990s.138  The resulting coalition, called Community 
Organized for Responsible Development (CORD), set about going door-to-door in the 
target neighborhoods, conducting citizen surveys and aggregating common grievances.139   
Through this process, CORD developed a broad array of “community” demands 
that would need to be met, else the coalition would use its lobbying muscle to delay the 
permitting approvals the hospital needed to break ground in 2005.140  When the hospital 
finally made its formal announcement on November 30, 2004 that it planned to construct 
a $430 million cancer center in New Haven’s impoverished “Hill” neighborhood,141 
CCNE was ready to hit the ground running. 
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 CORD recognized that its success would hinge upon its ability to serve as a power 
broker for recurring and essential grievances of neighborhood residents.  Parking and 
traffic patterns proved a recurring topic—with many local residents already angry over 
hospital staff occupying street parking spaces in residential zones—along with concerns 
over lead contamination from building demolition.142  Drawing from the 800 surveys it 
collected, CORD crafted a set of proposed benefits that would need to be met before 
CORD would give its seal of approval to the project.  Some of the proposed benefits met 
the needs of neighboring residents (such as traffic and parking restrictions).  Some were 
designed to garner broader support within the New Haven community (such as job 
training programs, local hiring commitments, and a program designed to grant affordable 
and free care to low income residents).  And one provision—negotiated separately from 
the development agreement—was tailor-made for District 1199: an “Election Principles 
Agreement” that departed from the standard NLRA secret ballot election process and 
created an environment more hospitable to organizing efforts.143  
Over the course of a year and a half, CORD and the hospital did battle, with 
CORD growing its membership base and the hospital continuing to speak out against the 
coalition’s proposed demands.  With echoes of the 1996 strike against Yale, CORD and 
CCNE cultivated a tremendously public collective action campaign against the hospital, 
mobilizing citizens and celebrities to stand in solidarity against a hospital administration 
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that had been painted as anti-poor, anti-union, and anti-community.144  Ultimately, the 
hospital’s CEO Joseph Zaccagnino resigned, and the new hospital leadership entered 
negotiations with CORD, ultimately settling on a package of benefits—valued at $5 
million—that included concessions for the community, the city, and the union.145 
 
D. From Grassroots to Control of City Hall 
 
The unions’ success with the cancer center offered concrete proof that CCNE’s 
tactical approach—grassroots, neighborhood-focused organizing and broad based 
coalitions—could offer tangible results.  The ensuing years allowed the unions to further 
test and refine their strategy.  UNITE HERE leveraged its grassroots network in support 
of Barack Obama’s first presidential campaign in 2007 and 2008.146  In 2010, the Locals 
34 and 35 reactivated its organizing team for the Connecticut gubernatorial race, 
prompting an astonishing rate of turnout for democratic candidate Dan Malloy.147  That 
same year also marked the lowest margin by which incumbent Mayor John DeStefano 
won reelection.148  
The ascendant political prowess of the unions prompted labor to make an 
aggressive push to take city hall, displacing many of the alders who were perceived to be 
part of DeStefano’s political machine.149  In the 2011 democratic primaries for the Board 
of Aldermen, the unions endorsed a slate of new aldermanic candidates but refused to 
make a mayoral endorsement, notwithstanding DeStefano’s historical support for 
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organized labor.150  Due in part to a crowded field of mayoral challengers, DeStefano was 
less able to lend support to the candidates he favored for the Board.151  The union-backed 
candidates won 17 out of 18 contested races, allowing them to form a supermajority 
sufficient to override a mayoral veto.152  And despite an attempt to upset union 
dominance in 2013,153 Labor once again solidified its primacy in aldermanic politics, 
cementing in place its “supermajority” powers for another two years.154  Two of the 
union-backed alders—Brenda Foskey-Cyrus (Ward 21) and Delphine Clyburn (Ward 
20)—came to play a central role as the drama over 580 Dixwell unfolded. 
 
III. THE FIGHT OVER 580 DIXWELL AVENUE 
 
On December 17, 2012 the Board of Alderman unanimously agreed to sell the 
parcel of land known as 580 Dixwell Avenue to Achievement First155 for a purchase price 
of $1.5 million.156  In many ways, the story of 580 Dixwell—known best as the site of the 
Martin Luther King School—begins in 1995, when Mayor John DeStefano leveraged 
substantial quantities of state aid to rebuild New Haven’s public schools.  For nearly 
twenty-five years, not a single school in New Haven had been built, rebuilt, or 
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significantly renovated.157  With support from a major influx of state grants for school 
construction,158 Mayor DeStefano developed a school construction plan that aimed to 
demolish and reconstruct or renovate all of New Haven’s public schools—topping up 
funding shortfalls with proceeds from the sale of the city’s delinquent tax liens.159  The 
MLK School, however intact, would not see the benefits of school construction 
financing, and in 2010 the school closed its doors permanently.160  
 By the end of 2012, Mayor DeStefano’s $1.5 billion program had touched forty 
schools throughout New Haven, with an additional six in the pipeline.161  The physical 
achievements of the program were undeniably impressive, but the guts of an 
underperforming public school system remained, offering poor performance across a 
range of school metrics, from high dropout and low graduation rates162 to major 
deficiencies in substantive educational metrics.163  In 2009, the Mayor kicked off a new 
school reform initiative aiming to close the achievement gap between New Haven Public 
Schools (NHPS) and public schools across the rest of the state.   
Ten years earlier, owing in part to the passage in 1996 of a charter school 
enabling act in the state legislature,164 Amistad Academy was founded as one of the first 
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public charter schools in New Haven.165  The founders went on to create Achievement 
First in 2003 as a separate 501(c)(3) charter management organization, dedicated to 
creating high-performing public schools in Connecticut and, eventually, New York and 
Rhode Island.  Four Achievement First schools were operational in New Haven by 2006, 
with consistently high enrollment demands from area parents.166  By 2012, Achievement 
First’s high school, Amistad Academy, had over 300 students, and desperately needed 
new space to accommodate current students and offer spaces to new students rising 
through the organization’s lower and middle schools.167  In addition, its current location 
lacked sports facilities, which was an essential ingredient for the school’s future 
expansion plans.168   
Several years prior to the controversy at 580 Dixwell, Achievement First narrowly 
escaped a similar neighborhood battle when it undertook to consolidate its elementary 
and middle school academies into the recently shuttered Timothy Dwight Elementary 
School.169  The school had closed in the spring of 2008,170 and immediately thereafter the 
Board of Education transferred the property to the city to determine its ultimate 
disposition.171  By November, the city announced its intention to sell the property, and in 
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early 2009 news reports surfaced indicating that Achievement First had entered 
negotiations with the city to purchase the school.172   
Dwight residents and community leaders were taken by surprise.  Before the 
school had closed, Dwight residents believed they would have an opportunity to convert 
the school into a local community center.173  Alarmed by the city’s change of heart and 
the swiftness with which it entered negotiations with Achievement First, two local 
leaders (Florita Gillespie, the neighborhood’s management team leader, and Dwight 
alderwoman Gina Calder) publicly contemplated a lawsuit to scuttle the deal.174  
Although a lawsuit was never filed, Gillespie and Calder used their leverage to guarantee 
residents’ access to the facilities for community events.  More controversially, they 
successfully secured a commitment from Achievement First that some neighborhood 
children would be given priority in the student placement lottery, requiring the school to 
secure a legislative modification to change its admissions policies.175  
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The same year that Achievement First negotiated the purchase of the Dwight 
School, it initiated a search for a new location for its Amistad High School.  In addition 
to its space constraints, the school was divided between two buildings and split across a 
busy New Haven street.176  As part of its search, Achievement First identified several key 
criteria for its permanent home, including sufficient acreage to house approximately 
75,000 square feet of building space, adequate parking for staff, faculty, and visitors, and 
a sports field.177  In addition, the site had to meet all architectural, engineering and 
education space specifications and site eligibility criteria for Connecticut school 
construction grants.178   
In 2010, the state made permanent the “charter school facility grant” program, 
which provides financial assistance for charter school capital projects.179  In years prior, 
charters had been limited to school financing of up to $500,000, and only recently had the 
state piloted the elimination of the $500,000 cap on facilities grants.180  In 2011, 
contingent upon meeting the eligibility criteria and submission of a final grant 
application, the state legislature conditionally approved a state grant of $24 million, 
totaling 68.93% of the $35 million total that Achievement First anticipated spending on 
the project.181  The remaining $11 million would be the responsibility of Achievement 
First, which planned to secure private donations to make up the deficit.182  
                                                
176 Interview with Reshma Singh (Apr. 2012), supra note 168. 
177 Id.  
178 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-283 et seq. (2009). 
179 See § 10-66hh (2009). 
180 See LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORPORATION, 2010 CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITY FINANCE 
LANDSCAPE 34 (June 2010). 
181 See 2011 Conn. Acts No. 12-179 § 26.  
182 See 580 DIXWELL LAND DISPOSITION AGREEMENT, ATTACHMENT B, supra note 156 (detailing the 
financing of the project, along with a development schedule, breakdown of costs, and the proposed 
rehabilitation plan). 
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Achievement First considered numerous sites,183 but the MLK School fit the 
necessary criteria and offered a central location for area students, as many as 27% of 
whom lived in the Newhallville/Dixwell community.184  On April 30, 2012, Mayor 
DeStefano sent a letter to Achievement First CEO, Dacia Toll, indicating the Mayor’s 
intent to work with Achievement First to negotiate a price and, with final ratification by 
the Board of Alderman, sell the parcel.185 
Dispositions of public property in New Haven, including surplus school property, 
typically follow one of four processes overseen by the city’s Livable City Initiative: (a) 
by development competition; (b) by programmatic disposition; (c) by negotiated sale; or 
(d) by general disposition.186  The delegated function of land disposition offers the city an 
expedited mechanism for tackling a range of land disposition procedures, ranging from 
the minimally contentious (such as the sale of sliver lots and adjacent tax foreclosures) to 
the highly visible and frequently controversial development agreements, some of which 
involve subsidized sales and tax abatements.187  The Board of Alderman initiated the sale 
of 580 Dixwell through the Livable City Initiative, but determined the land disposition 
                                                
183 Including: 34 Level Street; 240 Winthrop Avenue; 280 Goffe Street; 26 & 36 River Street; 49 Prince & 
22 Gold Street; 169 Davenport; 915 Ella Grasso Boulevard; 130 Leeder Hill Road, Hamden; Blake Street 
Center; State Street Star Supply Co.; 91 Shelton Avenue; and 370 James Street. 
184 Interview with Reshma Singh (Apr. 2012), supra note 168. 
185 See NEW HAVEN, CONN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, tit. III, Art. IV, § 21-9; 21-22  (“The bureau is 
authorized to engage in…(2) acquisition and disposition of real estate, on behalf of the City of New Haven, 
by all methods permitted by law [….] Property so acquired shall be disposed of in accordance with the land 
disposition guidelines approved by the board of aldermen on December 1, 1997, as amended from time to 
time, and in a manner consistent with applicable law.”) 
186 CITY OF NEW HAVEN, BOARD OF ALDERMAN, GUIDELINES FOR THE DISPOSITION OF CITY OWNED 
PROPERTY 3 (2009) (on file with author).  A development competition is typically reserved for parcels that 
“are of significant public and/or neighborhood interest” and thus warrant competitive sale processes.  Id. at 
4.  Programmatic dispositions are used for properties acquired by the City through a “Board of Aldermen-
approved Redevelopment Plan and/or Municipal Development Plan.”   Id. at 5.  Negotiated sales—the 
process used for the sale of 580 Dixwell—are used for properties acquired through tax or mortgage 
foreclosure or surplus property, such as properties transferred to the city by the Board of Education.  See id.  
And finally, general disposition refers to all other disposition agreements not falling into the above three 
categories.  Id. at 6.   
187 For a valuable and detailed description of one competitive land disposition process in New Haven, see 
Jeremy Kutner, supra note 42 at 13-15. 
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approval would occur instead by general municipal ordinance later in 2012, bypassing the 
strictures of the City’s Land Disposition Guidelines and reverting to the City’s standard, 
chartered procedure for enacting ordinances and resolutions.188   
Under this process, the proposed disposition agreement was first to be drafted by 
the Livable City Initiative.  Second, the City Plan Commission would offer its advisory 
approval of the proposed agreement (in this case, the “Order Authorizing the Mayor of 
the City of New Haven to Execute and Deliver a Quit Claim Deed, Land Disposition 
Agreement, and Any and All Other Documents Necessary to Sell the Property Known as 
580 Dixwell Avenue”) and forward it to the Board for its consideration as an ordinance.  
Third, upon receipt of the agreement, the board would forward the proposal to the 
relevant sub-committee—here, the Community Development Committee (CDC)—for 
public hearing and committee approval.  Presuming at least a majority approval by the 
voting members of the CDC, the matter would be then forwarded to the full Board for a 
“first reading” of the ordinance, a “second reading,” and then a final vote.189  Following 
aldermanic approval, the mayor may then execute the contract of sale with the 
purchaser.190 
Following the Mayor’s letter of intent guaranteeing exclusivity of negotiations,191  
Achievement First and the city’s Livable City Initiative agreed to a negotiation process to 
arrive at the final sale price.192  Achievement First and the city would each commission 
an appraisal to value the land. Achievement First would then prepare an environmental 
                                                
188 Interview with John Ward, Economic Development Counsel, City of New Haven (Oct. 7, 2013); see 
NEW HAVEN, CONN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, tit. 1, Art. IX., § 41 (Municode 2013). 
189 See id. 
190 See GUIDELINES FOR THE DISPOSITION OF CITY OWNED PROPERTY, supra note 186 at 6.  
191 See Shahid Abdul-Karim, Alternate Sites Eyed for New Haven High School, NEW HAVEN REGISTER 
(Dec. 4, 2012). 
192 Testimony of Erik Johnson, Director, Livable City Initiative, CITY OF NEW HAVEN, BOARD OF 
ALDERMAN, HEARING (Dec 17, 2012) [audio on file with author]. 
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due diligence report and commission several environmental studies to project the costs of 
any necessary environmental remediation. This included asbestos removal, and, because 
the parcel housed a gas station from the 1920s to the 1950s, the site would need to be 
cleared of any remaining toxins, such as polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB).193  The final 
price would result from the highest appraisal, less an aggregate estimate of all 
environmental remediation costs.194     
After completing the three independent appraisals (two paid for by Achievement 
First, one by the City), two independent estimates of PCB removal (paid for by 
Achievement First), and two assessments for asbestos removal (paid for by Achievement 
First), the final breakdown of the sales price was proposed as follows:195 
 
Highest appraised value      $2,135,000 
Estimated cost of PCB removal     ($555,000) 
Estimated cost of Asbestos removal    ($80,000) 
Final sale price       $1,500,000 
 
The negotiations proceeded smoothly as they wended their way through the 
technocratic processes overseen by the Livable City Initiative and the Office of the City 
Plan. The Livable City Initiative adopted the proposed budget into its recommendation of 
sale,196  which the City Plan Commission approved unanimously.197   
                                                
193 See Bailey, supra note 1. 
194 See Testimony of Erik Johnson, supra note 192. 
195 Email from Reshma Singh, Vice President of External Relations, Achievement First (Apr. 29, 2013).  
Ultimately, three appraisals were commissioned—the city’s appraised value was the highest, coming in at 
$2,135,000 (the Estrada appraisal).  Those commissioned by Achievement First were substantially lower, at 
$1,850,000 (the Amodio appraisal) and $1,700,000 (the Michaued appraisal) respectively.  In addition, two 
separate firms provided independent cost estimates of the PCB removal, and Achievement First obtained a 
separate cost estimate for asbestos removal: First PCB cost estimate $840,000 (prepared by ALTA 
Environmental).  Second PCB cost estimate: between $400,000 and $500,000 (prepared by Fuss & 
O’Neill).  Asbestos abatement estimate shows total cost at $79,470 (memorandum from Northstar to Alta 
Environmental).  
196 See CITY OF NEW HAVEN, LIVABLE CITY INITIATIVE, PROPERTY DIVISION, ACQUISITION/DISPOSITION 
SUMMARY SHEET FOR 580 DIXWELL AVENUE (Sept. 21, 2012) [attached to legislative master file LM-2012-
0318].  
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The parallel processes before the Board of Alderman, however, took a different 
turn when Achievement First sought political support for their proposal.  In approaching 
the Newhallville negotiations, Achievement First benefitted from its experience in 
negotiating its move to the Dwight school.  Community access to space and geographic 
preferences for neighborhood youth proved crucial in the former deal, and it was 
predictable that analogous requests would issue from the community once again.198   
But the Dwight deal was different.  For starters, because the Dwight school was 
an elementary school; not only was it was feasible for Achievement First to modify its 
admission lottery through legislation, but it also made sense operationally.199  
Achievement First’s high school, in contrast, was built grade by grade, building its upper 
levels each year with students who had already been schooled in Achievement First’s 
curriculum and pedagogical method.  The school wanted its high school students to have 
passed through its lower level “feeder schools” as a prerequisite.200  In addition, it would 
have to amend its working agreement with New Haven Public Schools—who runs the 
lottery for charter admissions on behalf of Achievement First.201 
More significantly, the Dwight deal took place in 2009, two years before the 
political balance of the Board had shifted.  Both of Newhallville’s alders—Brenda 
Foskey-Cyrus (Ward 21) and Delphine Clyburn (Ward 20)—formed part of the union-
                                                                                                                                            
197 Karyn Gilvarg, Executive Director of the City Plan Department formally adopted an advisory approval, 
recommending the City Plan Commission approve the land disposition agreement based on the $1.5 million 
purchase price negotiated by the Livable City Initiative.  See CITY OF NEW HAVEN, CITY PLAN 
COMMISSION ADVISORY REPORT RE: 580 DIXWELL AVENUE (Oct. 17, 2012).  The proposal was 
unanimously approved by all City Plan commissioners.  See Thomas MacMillan, Wrecking Ball Closes In 
On MLK School, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Oct. 22, 2012).  
198 See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text. 
199 See id.  
200 See interview with Reshma Singh (Apr. 2012), supra note 168. 
201 See interview with Reshma Singh, Vice President of External Relations, Achivement First (Oct. 15, 
2013).  
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backed slate elected to the Board in 2011.202  Delphine Clyburn, a group home worker, 
worked as a steward of Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 1199.203  
Brenda Foskey-Cyrus was not affiliated with the unions directly, but received financial 
support for her election in 2011.204  Both alderwomen defeated candidates endorsed by 
DeStefano and backed by Rev. Boise Kimber.205  And both alders’ support would be 
essential in guaranteeing a “yes” vote on the sale before the full Board.206  Foskey-Cyrus 
chaired the Board of Aldermen’s CDC, whose approval was required before the matter 
could come before the full Board for a vote.207  And because the school’s future 
neighbors on the northern side of West Hazel Street fell within Ward 20, Alderwoman’s 
Clyburn support was critical, too. 
Achievement First made the first move in early 2012, reaching out to the alders to 
let them know of their intentions, and to establish a channel of communication.208   At 
that point the alders began canvassing the neighborhood.  Over the course of the summer, 
Ms. Foskey-Cyrus contends that she began went door to door to discuss the proposed sale 
and collect any concerns of neighborhood landowners.209  Once she “got a feel for the 
way the neighbors responded,” she began discussing the matter with her fellow alders on 
                                                
202 Paul Bass, For New Majority, Campaign’s Just Beginning, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Nov. 25, 2011). 
203 See Joelle Fishman, New Haven Candidates’ Fight for Jobs Is “What we Need”, PEOPLESWORLD.ORG 
(Aug. 29, 2011), http://peoplesworld.org/new-haven-candidates-fight-for-jobs-is-what-we-need/; Paul Bass, 
Labor’s Secret Weapon, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Aug 8, 2006). 
204 See Melissa Bailey, 2nd-Term Goal: Revive Q House, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Jun 28, 2013).  In 2013, 
however, Brenda Foskey Cyrus ended her affiliation with the union-funded political action committee.  See 
Rachel Chinapen, New Haven Aldermanic Candidates Continue to Draw Union Financial Support, NEW 
HAVEN REGISTER (Sept. 3, 2013). 
205 See Staff, Carolina, Clergy Spar, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Oct. 5, 2013). 
206 See Shahid Abdul-Karim, Newhallville Community Divided Over Plans for New High School,  NEW 
HAVEN REGISTER (Nov. 24, 2012).  Delphine Clyburn, a group home worker, is also a steward of Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 1199.   
207 CITY OF NEW HAVEN, BOARD OF ALDERMAN, 2012-2013 COMMITTEES (2013), 
http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/aldermen/index.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
208 See interview with Brenda Foskey-Cyrus (Oct. 7, 2013). 
209 Id.  
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the CDC, and brought the matter to the attention of Newhallville’s community 
management team (CMT)—a volunteer organization that gathers voices from area 
residents and businesses.210   
Negotiations remained fluid throughout October and November.  Achievement 
First had clearly garnered sufficient trust from the alders that they were wiling to support 
them through their first administrative hurdle.  On October 17, the alders endorsed the 
plan as it came before the City Plan Commission, which unanimously approved the 
proposal.211   But between that approval and Achievement First’s second administrative 
hurdle—a request for a special exception before the Board of Zoning appeals—the tenor 
of the conversation shifted. 
Throughout October, Achievement First attempted to schedule meetings with the 
alders for the purpose of discussing the deal and addressing concerns of the constituents 
of Wards 20 and 21.212  The meetings were intended to serve as broad forums for 
consolidating neighborhood input, but numerous unidentified individuals arrived at the 
meeting with no introduction of who they were, why they were there, or whom they 
represented: they “just showed up.”213  From these meetings it became clear that student 
slots and community access were not the only sticking points for negotiated benefits.214  
In response, Achievement First made a highly public announcement at the end of 
the month, staking out a position for what benefits it portrayed to be fair, practicable, and 
                                                
210 The CMT’s monthly meetings offer a regular, open forum for soliciting local input on pressing issues 
within the neighborhood, such as policing updates and land developments.  See Newhallville Community 
Management Team, http://newhallvillecmt.blogspot.com/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
211 See CITY PLAN COMM’N ADVISORY REP., supra note 219; Allan Appel & Melissa Bailey, MLK-Amistad 
Sale Gets A Unanimous Thumbs Up, NEW HAVEN INDEPENDENT (Nov. 30, 2012) (“The project sailed 
through the City Plan Commission with the help of Newhallville neighbors and Alderwomen Foskey-Cyrus 
and Clyburn.”).   
212 Interview with Reshma Singh (Apr. 2012), supra note 169. 
213 Id.   
214 The author was unable to confirm the content of the provisions proposed at these informal meetings. 
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responsive to community input.  Based on questions posed to Achievement First by 
community members at a CMT meeting on October 23, Achievement First prepared a 
public response that included a summary of its proposed benefits:  (a) community access 
to indoor facilities and the athletic field; (b) a commitment that the $35 million 
construction program would meet hiring quotas for employing local, minority and female 
workers; and (c) approximately 11,000 hours of community service per year by Amistad 
students—much of which would be in service of the local community.215   
Striking what could be perceived as an indignant note, the release stated that the 
revitalization of the MLK School is, in and of itself, a community benefit that “will 
beautify the block, reduce criminal activity on the property, and provide a safe space for 
community use.”216  Furthermore, 313 students who attended Achievement First schools 
in New Haven live in Wards 20 and 21, and “[h]aving their school so close to home is a 
benefit for those students and their families.”217  Notably absent from this proposal were 
any references to geographic preferences for neighborhood students, as well as any 
mention of a labor neutrality and card check agreement for certain segments of the staff. 
Shortly thereafter, on November 13 Achievement First appeared before the Board 
of Zoning Appeals,218 but this time they received considerably less enthusiasm from the 
alders.  Achievement First sought a special exception for a reduced number of parking 
spaces (138 spaces were required by zoning; Achievement First sought to reduce that 
figure to 100), as well as several variances for exterior signage and the construction of a 
three story building in a RM-2 zone, which only permits one story school construction as 
                                                
215 See Achievement First, AF Responses to Community Questions Received on October 23, 2012 
Newhallville Management Team Meeting (Oct. 25, 2012) [on file with author].  
216 Id.  
217 Id. 
218 See CITY OF NEW HAVEN, BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS, AGENDA 1471 (Nov. 13, 2012). 
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of right.219  During the hearing, one member of the BZA asked Achievement First 
directly about the community benefits agreement; Achievement First responded that they 
were “moving along in good faith.”220  The alders, though present at the hearing (sitting 
at the back of the room), remained substantially more circumspect than in the 
presentation before the City Plan Commission: neither testified before the BZA on 
Achievement First’s behalf.221 
Just as the public displays between the alders and Achievement First were 
cooling, a new stumbling block appeared in the path of the school in the form of the New 
Haven Clergy.  Rev. Boise Kimber, former president of the Greater New Haven Clergy 
Association (a coalition partner of CCNE in its fight over the Yale-New Haven Cancer 
Center), along with GNHCA’s current President, Rev. James Newman, publicly attacked 
Achievement First, the two alders, and members of the negotiating committee for a 
negotiation process that the two alleged was both closed and lacking in transparency.222  
Both individuals lead congregations in the immediate vicinity of the school: Rev. 
Kimber’s New Cavalry Baptist Church sits directly across Dixwell Avenue from the 
MLK plot; Rev. Newman serves as the pastor at the New Freedom Missionary Baptist 
Church at 280 Starr Street, one block to the east of 580 Dixwell.223  
 
                                                
219 See CITY OF NEW HAVEN, CITY PLAN COMM’N, ADVISORY REPORT 580 DIXWELL AVE NO. 1471-15 
(Nov. 20, 2012) [hereinafter CITY PLAN COMM’N ADVISORY REP. NOV. 20]; NEW HAVEN, CONN., ZONING 
ORDINANCE, Art. III, § 14 (Municode 2013). 
220 Thomas MacMillan, Amistad Plan Runs Into Boise Kimber, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Nov. 14, 2012). 
221 Id.   Both alders declined to comment specifically on the matter.  Id.  Delphine Clyburn noted, however: 
“[w]e came to listen tonight.”  Id.  The BZA approved the parking exception, conditional on the prohibition 
of student parking, see CITY PLAN COMM’N ADVISORY REP., supra note 219 at 2, and referred the 
remaining variance requests to the City Plan Commission for further review.   
222 See MacMillan, supra note 220; Shahid Abdul-Karim, Greater New Haven Clergy Association Lacks 
Faith in Process Involved in New Amistad Academy, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Dec. 9, 2012).  
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Figure 3 - Location of Churches in Relation to 580 Dixwell 
Source: City of New Haven Bd. of Aldermen, Aldermanic Ward Maps (2012).   
Reverends Kimber and Newman attended the November 13 hearings at the BZA, 
along with several congregants, to address concerns related specifically to the traffic- and 
parking-related impacts of the project.224  In addition to those practical complaints, 
Kimber asserted that neither Achievement First nor the alders had consulted him, and 
that, given the size of the project, their failure to reach out to the affected residents and 
churches should be cause for concern.225  The GNHCA’s objections to the purported lack 
of transparency and a failure of the ostensibly collaborative negotiation process to 
proactively solicit input from those most affected by the project became a sticking point 
for the pastors.226   
At this point, public information related to the scope of the CBA came to a 
standstill.  Media reported four public sticking points, but no drafts of the CBA had been 
                                                
224 See MacMillan, supra note 220. 
225 See CITY PLAN COMM’N ADVISORY REP., supra note 219 at 1 (Nov. 20, 2012). 
226 Interview with Rev. James Newman, President, Greater New Haven Clergy Association (Dec. 13, 2013). 
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circulated.227  The reported sticking points were: (1) wage-related provisions for 
workers’; (2) a labor neutrality and card-check agreement; (3) a commitment by 
Achievement First to invest in Newhallville youth enrichment programs; and (4) 
enrollment slots for neighborhood students.228   
No information on the deal became public until the next meeting before the CDC 
on November 29.  At that meeting, Achievement First offered a series of commitments 
that extended past its October proposal.  In addition to diversity quotas for the 
construction labor, Achievement First committed to working with the City’s Commission 
on Equal Opportunity to increase the diversity of its permanent workforce. 229  It also 
proposed a partnership with New Haven Works, a non-profit jobs training, workforce 
development, and certification organization built with emphatic support by local 
unions.230   
The alders’ comments remained vague and non-committal, suggesting through 
their emphasis on good neighborhood jobs that a final deal had yet to arrive.231  
Reverends Kimber and Newman also testified, accusing the alderwomen of failing to 
notify them of the community meetings, and reiterating concerns about the lack of 
transparency and exclusion from the meetings.  On motion by Ms. Foskey-Cyrus, the 
CDC unanimously approved the disposition agreement, setting the stage for a “first 
reading” before the full Board on December 3.  
                                                
227 See MacMillan, supra note 220. 
228 Id.   
229 See CITY OF NEW HAVEN, BOARD OF ALDERMEN, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE MEETING 
MINUTES (Nov. 29, 2012) [hereinafter CDC NOV. 29 MINUTES]. 
230 Id.; see also Harold Meyerson, The New New Haven, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (May 23, 2013) 
(describing New Haven Works as a “small-scale version of the successful employer-funded job-training 
and certification program that UNITE HERE runs for prospective hotel employees in Las Vegas.”). 
231 CDC NOV. 29 MINUTES, supra note 229.  
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But by the time December 3 rolled around something had gone awry.  Instead of 
placing the matter before the Board for consideration, Ms. Foskey-Cyrus—with minimal 
explanation—moved to send the project back to the CDC.232   “We are still negotiating a 
community benefits agreement with Achievement First,” she noted; the deal had not been 
finalized.  Her justification for re-committing the matter to the CDC was reportedly 
related to the price set by the Livable City Initiative—specifically, a differential of $1.3 
million between the $1.5 million sales price arrived at by LCI and the 2011 assessed 
value of $2.8 million.  People wanted to know “why LCI came up with an assessment 
different that the property developer says it’s worth.”233  Though not noted by Ms. 
Foskey-Cyrus, the issue of the sales price differential had been explained repeatedly with 
both alders in attendance—including merely five days prior when it had been presented 
before the CDC on November 29.234  The Board approved the motion unanimously, and 
the matter would be delayed until it reconvened on December 17.235   
Interpreting Foskey-Cyrus’s move as presenting an opening for additional 
community input, the following day Rev. Newman issued a press release commending 
the alderwomen for: 
leading the Board of Aldermen to opening the […] sale to more transparency. 
Sending the proposed sales agreement back to the [CDC] for additional discussion 
will eventually lead to a better Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) that will 
benefit all parties involved; the neighbors in that community, the city 
administration, Achievement First, and most of all, the students who will attend 
that institution.236 
                                                
232 Testimony of Alderwoman Brenda Foskey Cyrus, CITY OF NEW HAVEN, BOARD OF ALDERMAN, 
HEARING (Dec 3, 2012) [hereinafter BD. OF ALDERMAN HEARING DEC. 3]. 
233 Id. 
234 CDC NOV. 29 MINUTES, supra note 229 at 3 (documenting that Erik Johnson, Director of the Livable 
City Initiative, and other LCI staff discussed the appraisal process, explained why it did not rely on the $2.8 
million tax assessment, and explained that the cost of environmental remediation would be deducted from 
the highest appraisal value). 
235 BD. OF ALDERMAN HEARING DEC. 3, supra note 232.  
236 See Greater New Haven Clergy Association, Press Release (Dec. 4, 2012).  
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No doubt anticipating that the statement would help insure the clergy’s involvement in 
the final negotiation process, Rev. Newman articulated a set of requests that he contended 
were for the benefit of his congregants and local residents (see below table): 
Benefits Proposed by the Greater New Haven Clergy Association237 
1. Residential Parking: due to increased parking demands on neighborhood, AF would 
agree to pay for permit parking for the next 30 years for all residents on streets bordering 
the school. 
2. Timing of School Activities: AF would guarantee that school and after-school 
activities would be scheduled, monitored and supervised as to not interfere with the peace 
and tranquility of the neighbors. 
3. Garbage Receptacles: AF would commit to installing stylish and neighborhood friendly 
garbage receptacles on the site. 
4. Lighting: AF would guarantee that lighting as a result of the size and placement of the 
school will not interfere with the peace and tranquility of the neighbors. 
5. Public Use of Facilities: AF would allow use of the school parking facilities on evening 
and weekends for community groups and businesses in the area, along with a written 
plan for how the use of the proposed sports field and community room is managed. 
6. Privacy Fences: AF would offer to install privacy fences for all immediate neighbors. 
 
Rev. Newman’s optimism proved illusory, however, as the negotiating committee 
convened a private, closed-door meeting on December 5.238  Included in the meeting, in 
addition to the alders and Achievement First, were CCNE and members of union locals 
(UNITE-HERE and AFSCME, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees); the clergymen were not invited.239 
Aware that the meeting was taking place at the Lincoln-Basset school, Rev. 
Newman attempted to join notwithstanding his lack of an invitation.240  Upon his arrival 
at the school, the pastor was barred from entry by another clergyman (and co-founder of 
both CCNE and CORD), Rev. Scott Marks.241 Several other individuals and a reporter 
                                                
237 See id.  
238 Paul Bass, Progress Resumes in MLK-Amistad Talks, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Dec. 5, 2012). 
239 See id.; Interview with Rev. Newman, supra note 226.  
240 Interview with Rev. Newman, supra note 226. 
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were also barred from the meeting.242  Although Rev. Newman attempted to look through 
the window of the door to see who was in attendance, Rev. Marks blocked his view.243 
Shortly after the December 5 closed-door session, Rev. Newman issued another 
press release, offering a stinging rebuke of the furtive negotiations from which he was 
excluded.244  Asserting that the “mystery behind all of the clandestine closed-to-the-
public meetings is that the union funded Connecticut Center for a New Economy 
(CCNE),” Reverend Newman railed against what he called a “mugging” that served only 
to benefit the Achievement First and the union-backed aldermen, and once again 
demanded a transparent and open negotiating process.245   
  But the clergy’s protests, vociferous as they were, fell on deaf ears; the December 
5 meeting marked the conclusive end of the community benefits agreement negotiations, 
even though the agreement had yet to be made public.246  On December 17, following 
brief remarks by the Livable City Initiative (once again addressing how the city arrived at 
the $1.5 million sales price), Achievement First, and Ms. Foskey-Cyrus, the matter was 
put to a vote—first before the CDC, which unanimously approved the agreement, and 
secondly before the full board, which also approved the LDA unanimously.  The final 
copy of the “win win” community benefits agreement, as described by Ms. Foskey-
Cyrus, was distributed publicly.  With the exception of the request for community access, 
                                                
242 Id. 
243 Id.  The author contacted Bob Proto, President of the New Haven Central Labor Council and UNITE-
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244 See Greater New Haven Clergy Association, Press Release (Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter GNHCA Dec. 
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246 See id.  
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none of the benefits requested by Rev. Newman and the Greater New Haven Clergy 
Association were included in the final CBA: 
 
Final CBA as Approved and Incorporated into Final Land Disposition Agreement 
(LDA)247  
1. Permanent Jobs: AF agrees to partner with New Haven Works (NHW) to recruit, 
train, & place New Haven residents into positions at AF schools (including, but not 
limited to the new high-school).  Jobs program will last for five years.  
2. Construction Jobs: AF commits to supervise its construction contractors and 
subcontractors to ensure compliance with state grant quota requirements for 
minorities, women, ex-felons, and local New Haven residents.  
3. Student Access: A commitment of 10 spaces for new 9th grade students who 
have not attended AF feeder schools. 
4. Staff Diversity, Recruitment, and Retention: A commitment to retaining, 
engaging, and promoting black, Latino, and multi-racial staff, as well as first-
generation college graduates.248 
5. Community Access to Space: A commitment by Achievement First, once the 
final construction plans for the school are in place (including specific amenities), to 
provide a list of usable areas, which will include, at a minimum, the gym and athletic 
field.  AF will also grant access to the Newhallville Management Team, the Ward 20 
and 21 Political Committees (of any affiliation) and other eligible community 
organizations, and will remain a public polling location. 
6. Murals: A commitment to establish a work of art “that pays tribute to civil rights 
leaders as the former MLK side does” that will be visible from the street.   
7. General Provisions: (a) granting the City and the Board of Aldermen the right to 
request a court order requiring Achievement First to comply with the provisions of the 
CBA; (b) providing that CCNE will conduct annual performance reviews of 
Achievement First’s compliance with the agreement; and (c) a severability clause, 
providing that any provision is severable from the agreement if deemed void, invalid, 
or unenforceable by a court. 
 
But the agreements signed in ink neglected to include two provisions, which were 
arguably two of the most contentious and costly commitments agreed to by Achievement 
First: 
 
Two Additional Agreements Not Included in or Incorporated into the LDA249 
                                                
247 See 580 DIXWELL LAND DISPOSITION AGREEMENT, Exhibit B supra note 156. 
248 The CBA includes specific commitments by Achievement first to “tactical targets,” which include: “(a) 
30% of finalist candidates identify as Black, Latino, Multi-racial, or first-generation college graduates at 
[AF] New Haven schools (teachers and leaders); (b) No difference in matriculation rate for Black and 
Latino candidates versus overall matriculation rate; (c) 5% increase over last year in applications from 
Black, Latino, and multi-racial teachers and leaders for 2013-2014 and an additional 5% increase for 2014-
2015.”  See 580 DIXWELL LAND DISPOSITION AGREEMENT, Exhibit B supra note 156. 
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8. Labor Neutrality and Card Check Agreement. Achievement First committed to a neutral 
organizing process, based on card-check recognition, for unionization of cafeteria and 
security workers. 250 
9. Grant for Youth Enrichment Program.  In a separate agreement, Achievement First 
committed to contribute $150,000 to support youth enrichment programs for the benefit of 
neighborhood youth, with funding allocation decisions to be made by a six-member 
committee (three members to be chosen by Achievement First, three chosen by alders 
Foskey-Cyrus and Clyburn).  The Community Foundation For Greater New Haven serves as 
the the fiduciary.251 
 
Neither agreement was released publicly; neither was included—as was the “public” 
version of the CBA—in the final land disposition agreement signed by the Board.  
In the wake of the negotiations, Rev. Newman dropped his promise to pursue 
alternative routes of dissent.252  When asked whether he had considered trying to 
negotiated his own CBA for his constituents, he said no, but added, “I’m hopeful that 




IV. NORMATIVE EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS 
 
CBA proponents often highlight three salient features of CBAs that render them 
superior to the status quo of government-managed land use controls.  First, because of its 
flexibility, a CBA permits a wider range of interests to influence the allocation of burdens 
and benefits of land use decisions, and a wider range of solutions that can be crafted 
specifically to meet the needs of the interested participants.  The decisional outcomes 
                                                                                                                                            
249 Although the labor neutrality agreement and $150,000 cash grant were not included in the final CBA 
appended to the land disposition agreement, for purposes of simplicity, any references to the Newhallville 
CBA include all of the conditions negotiated during the meeting on December 3, 2012, which includes the 
labor agreement and the $150,000 grant for “youth enrichment.”  See Thomas MacMillan, It’s A Deal—& 
A Sale, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Dec. 18, 2012). 
250 See id.  
251 See id.  
252 Interview with Rev. Newman, supra note 226. 
253 Id.  
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may thus yield a more efficient allocation of resources.254  A second stated advantage is 
that CBAs create a more deliberative, participatory process that gives a voice to 
traditionally disempowered community members.255  The participation afforded to 
citizens under a CBA, therefore, may be procedurally superior to the regulatory 
apparatus.256  A third advantage is that CBAs may also offer a more equitable distribution 
of the costs and benefits of a development project, particularly when the project takes 
place in a historically disadvantaged community.257   
This section evaluates these claims against the normative standards of efficiency, 
procedural fairness, and distributive justice.  Although each CBA is highly context 
dependent, I argue that the structural peculiarities of the CBA embed certain biases that 
may result in both inefficient and unfair outcomes.  In addition, it is important to 
disaggregate the notion of “community,” identifying likely participants to determine 
whether there may be patterns of frequent winners and losers in the wake of a struggle 
over valuable concessions captured by the CBA process.  
 
A. An Introductory Note on Land Sales 
                                                
254 See Alejandro E. Camacho, Community Benefits Agreements: A Symptom, Not the Antidote, of Bilateral 
Land Use Regulation, 78 Brook. L. Rev. 355, 360 (2013); Matthew Raffol, Community Benefits 
Agreements in the Political Economy of Urban Development, in UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, SCHOOL OF 
SOCIAL SERVICE ADMINISTRATION, ADVOCATES’ FORUM 28, 35-36 (2012).  Cf. Daniel P. Selmi, The 
Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 591, 624-25 (2011) (portraying flexible 
deal-making as one method of promoting allocative efficiency); accord David A. Dana, The New 
“Contractarian” Paradigm in Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 51 (2000). 
255 See Murtaza H. Baxamusa, Empowering Communities Through Deliberation, 27 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 
261, 261-63 (2008); GROSS ET AL., MAKING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS MORE ACCOUNTABLE, supra note 89 
at 21-22. 
256 Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Community Benefits Agreements and Comprehensive Planning: 
Balancing Community Empowerment and the Police Power, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 157, 213 (2009) (“When 
CBAs are negotiated by broad based, inclusive coalitions that are truly representative of community 
interests, and such agreements result in a community planning vision that dramatically differs from the 
existing traditional comprehensive plan and implementing regulations for the area, it indicates that existing 
governmental planning processes may be inadequate, and the most appropriate action for a local 
government to take may be to reform the way that it plans.”). 
257 Id. (“A CBA that is negotiated by a historically disempowered community for a development that will 
have significant negative impacts will advance equity and fairness goals, rather than inhibit them.”) 
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 Before proceeding to a normative analysis of the Newhallville-Amistad CBA, a 
cautionary note is in order.  Unlike most CBAs, the Newhallville-Amistad CBA was 
negotiated as part of a public land disposition process, rather than as part of a land use 
regulation process like a zoning application or a development agreement.  While both 
regimes deal with land in the abstract, the immediate goal of land sales and land use 
controls appear at first glance not to be intimately connected.  
If the prototypical concern of land use regulation concerns the apportionment of 
power between private landowners and government bodies to determine how land should 
be used,258 a public land disposition serves only to complicate this analysis by adding 
additional fiscal and economic factors.   
On one axis stands the role of the city as a guardian of the public fisc.  By 
negotiating a sales price for a given asset, the city seeks to maximize the returns on 
investment that the public stands to gain by virtue of privatization or sale.  In that sense it 
is no different from the disposition of other surplus property—used computers, excess 
machinery, and the like.  But of course the sale of land is in no way like the sale of 
moveable property or an investment interest; to the contrary, urban land is a unique 
possession, encumbered both by the existing parameters that zoning laws will place on 
the buyer, and by the fact that privatization necessarily divests the city of some control 
over a formerly public space.259  As a result, the city does not act in a vacuum of wealth 
                                                
258 See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 42 at 31.  
259 See M.A. Qadeer, The Nature of Urban Land, 40 AM. J. OF ECON. & SOCIOLOGY 165, 167, 180 (1981) 
(arguing that urban land should be treated as a public good, and that disposition of public land must protect 
urban dwellers’ interests by paying particular attention to land’s social utility).  Of course, not all publicly 
owned land or facilities are inherently “public,” in the sense of a community resource, useable by all.  
Parks, courthouses, and plazas may be thought of the quintessential public space, whereas schools, public 
transit systems, and subsidized housing may be thought of as semi-public, limiting or foreclosing access on 
terms established by government policy.  Nevertheless, some theorists within the “right to the city” 
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maximization alone; rather, the city must balance its fiscal interests against a wider range 
of social and other economic interests that may be advanced by choosing among a variety 
of potentially productive uses for the parcel.260  
A second axis relates to the proposed use of the land as a function of both 
immediate and broader citywide interests.  A multitude of uses may be possible 
(depending, of course, on the existing zoning code, market forces, and the availability of 
subsidies)—from private factories and industrial sites to mixed-use, commercial, and 
residential functions, to public or quasi-public uses like schools, public parks, and 
hospitals.  The specifics of the proposed use will largely shape the public’s response, both 
in the immediate neighborhood (as the neighborhood residents will be most directly 
affected by a change in the status quo, whether positive or negative) and in the 
community at large.  Zoning laws have traditionally been characterized as addressing the 
former set of interests, helping allocate the benefits and burdens of the proposed 
development and determine the extent to which changes in the status quo will require 
offsetting by the developer.261  As to both sets of interests, the city acts in a role most 
analogous to a site-specific city planner.  By deciding which purchaser will be allowed to 
buy the relevant parcel contingent on the proposed use, the city may seek to maximize the 
                                                                                                                                            
movement have proposed a broader conception of public land, focusing on both the fiscal value of land as a 
commodity as well as the communal values offered by the right to participate in decisionmaking over 
public land and the way that such decisions are shaped.  See, e.g., DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: 
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC SPACE (2003); DAVID HARVEY, REBEL CITIES: FROM THE 
RIGHT TO THE CITY TO THE URBAN REVOLUTION (2012). 
260 See Qadeer, supra note 259 at 174 (noting that urban land is both a “utility” good and a “commercial” 
good—uses which may conflict with each other, as the most socially useful result may not produce the 
highest profit and vice versa). 
261 See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to The Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45, 47-
51 (1994). 
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net social benefits by balancing the interest of the immediate neighborhood, the city at 
large, and potentially even future taxpayers.262 
New Haven is not anomalous in this regard, sitting at the intersection of these two 
axes by seeking to maximize both fiscal gain and social utility in disposing of public 
property.  Structurally, and in the abstract, the city has delegated these responsibilities 
among various administrative and legislative bodies, including the Board of Education 
(recommending land for surplus status), the Livable City Initiative (overseeing 
negotiations on price); the City Plan Commission (providing advisory input on planning 
considerations); and the Board of Alderman (final ratification and approval).263   
The complexity of the land sale process—added, as it is, on top of an additional 
bundle of concerns associated with land regulation—may appear to underscore the 
uniqueness of the Newhallville-Amistad CBA in contrast with CBAs that have taken 
place in the context of development agreements or zoning applications.  This might signal 
that the Newhallville deal is a poor vehicle for analyzing the normative contributions of 
the CBA instrument as a whole.  
Conceding the differences between land disposition and land regulation, it would 
nevertheless be a mistake to view the two regimes as wholly distinct.  Obviously, a city 
sells land with the expectation that it will be used for some purpose that differs from its 
                                                
262 As an example of highly detailed, state-mandated planning requirements that require forward-looking 
assessments, Wyoming requires the any school district, prior to disposing of surplus school property, 
propose the disposition to a statewide School Facilities Department that will evaluate the proposed lease or 
sale in reference to each school district’s school facilities plan.  See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-15-123 (West 
2013).  
263 See discussion infra Part III.  Practically speaking, however, in the context of 580 Dixwell, the potential 
policy-based complexity of the process was truncated when the project was partially pre-ordained by 
Mayor DeStafano, who signaled his intent to sell the land to Amistad before the technocrats had a chance to 
review any concrete plans.  See Shahid Abdul-Karim, supra note 191.  While the sale of a public school 
plot to a privately-managed, non-profit charter school management organization appears a logical plan for 
the disposition of 580 Dixwell, DeStefano’s letter effectively delimited the city’s ability to consider issues 
beyond (a) price; and (b) the neighborhood-level changes associated with the new development.   
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present state.  The participants in the land sale process invariably take into account the 
vagaries and peculiarities of the zoning scheme in advance of negotiating a land deal, 
anticipating that the property as sold will, with sufficient probability, be put to a use 
permitted by the existing zoning code.   
Although each decision point seeks to advance a specific objective, the 
participants likely understand these decision points to be steps in the larger development 
enterprise, proceeding from point A (the status quo) to point B (a completed development 
project).  It is reasonable to assume that both the developer and the community 
negotiators recognize that the CBA is a one-shot deal; if the CBA cannot guarantee 
support for the project throughout all stages of the land disposition and zoning process, it 
would be a worthless guarantee for the developer indeed.  The possibility that a second, 
third, or fourth CBA might need to be negotiated with different interest groups in order to 
secure one particular component of an overall development project (such as a special 
exception or a construction permit) would dramatically decrease the predictability of the 
project from the outset.  This, in turn, would undermine the value of the CBA for the 
developer, and would eliminate much of the leverage that community groups possess in 
extracting benefits at the outset.  Without the ability to promise the developer a 
resounding voice of support for the project, a community coalition brings very little to the 
table that cannot be replicated by the developer itself.  
As a result, the savvy community coalition will seek to interject at the decision 
point at which they have the greatest power of leverage, rather than picking and choosing 
among the various types of land use decisions based on the substance of the issue in 
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consideration.264  Ultimately, the fact that the Newhalleville-Amistad CBA was 
negotiated in advance of the land sale, rather than in advance of zoning decisions taking 
place concurrent with the sale process, appears to be of limited consequence.  
 
B. Allocative Efficiency 
  
 One method of evaluating the relative benefit of the CBA is to consider it in the 
context of economic efficiency—specifically, whether the deal resulted in an optimal 
development outcome for all parties involved.  Land use regulations in their modern 
instantiations seek to resolve a particular problem posed by a theory of Coasian 
bargaining—namely, that the transaction costs and collective action failures associated 
with negotiating over the price of a proposed development project require some form of 
government participation to oversee the allocation of development rights.265  The 
“problem” that land use regulation seeks to solve is, at root, one of reducing the 
externalities associated with nuisance based on incompatible land uses.266  This theory 
has been challenged by numerous scholars, who question the validity of the underlying 
assumption regarding the value proposition of technocratic, political, or judicial oversight 
                                                
264 Julian Gross has proposed an elemental definition of CBAs under which a CBA must only, by 
definition, concern a “single development project.”  Gross, supra note 65 at 40.  Gross defines this 
atomistic, project-based focus in contrast with the idea of advocating for “single-issue policies that cover a 
range of projects.”  Id.  However, Gross excludes from his definition any requirement that the CBA be tied 
to a specific sub-approval within the overall land deal.  Rather, the CBA covers the project as a whole. 
265 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO 
AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 72 (1985) (defining zoning as a “collective community entitlement”  
[hereinafter FISCHEL, ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS]; id. at 82-103 (examining the question of community 
entitlements and Coasian bargaining, managed through the zoning process, through the example of a pulp 
mill seeking to gain development rights in a given community). 
266 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (“[T]he question whether the 
power exists to forbid the erection of a building of a particular kind or for a particular use, like the question 
whether a particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined, not by an abstract consideration of the building 
or of the thing considered apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances and the locality.  
A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard. 
If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative 
judgment must be allowed to control.”) (internal citations omitted); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960). 
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of land use transactions.267  And the idea that the nuisance-reduction model remains a 
valid theoretical foundation for land use controls appears increasingly suspect, as more 
theorists have noted the rapidity with which the “safety valve” of variances and 
exceptions to neutral regulations have been employed in land use decisions.268  
Nevertheless, the management theory of using local government to reduce transaction 
costs, maximize positive externalities, and reach optimal allocation of development rights 
may serve as a useful evaluative framework to determine whether the CBA as an 
instrument serves or detracts from such ends.269 
Efficiency analysis, of course, presents innumerable challenges, not the least of 
which is the impossibility of quantifying with precision the multitude of costs and 
benefits achieved by a given decision (whether as felt by the developer, the neighbor, the 
community at large, or the city) in comparison with the status quo.  Nevertheless, the 
negotiation itself offers hints at the relative weight of various preferences of many of the 
deal’s participants, allowing for a more careful examination of whether the deal as a 
whole represented an optimal outcome.270 
                                                
267 See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use 
Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 682 (1973); Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. L. & 
ECON. 71, 141-43 (1970). 
268 See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 42 at 294-296 (citing research by Richard Babcock and Eric Steele, 
among others, who agree with the empirical observation but disagree as to its significance).   
269 See FISCHEL, ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS, supra note 265; cf. Karkkainen, supra note 261 at 64-78 
(1994). 
270 This paper refers to efficiency in Kaldor-Hicks, rather than Pareto, terms.  In other words, the tool may 
be deemed “efficient” for Kaldor-Hicks purposes if there is a net positive spread between benefits and 
costs.  A Pareto efficient outcome, in contrast, would be defined by a scenario in which at least one party is 
made better off but no parties are made worse off as a result of the transaction.  See ELLICKSON & BEEN, 
supra note 42 at 96 (noting economists’ preference for Pareto efficiency and recognizing that most 
policymakers defer to Kaldor-Hicks criteria, particularly when compensation for losers in a land use 
outcome is hard to arrange).  
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 The fact that the deal was signed at all would appear to weigh heavily in favor of 
the CBA as a negotiating tool.271  At least in theory—and according to its own 
representations—Achievement First made clear its willingness to consider other land 
parcels, albeit only within the jurisdiction of New Haven.272  Land use and local 
government theorists have long considered the salience of “exit” as a key constraint on 
local government decision-makers, with some theorists viewing mobility as a signal of 
dissatisfaction and willingness to invest in other local land markets.273  The inference to 
be drawn from a successfully negotiated deal, then, is that the developer signaled a 
preference to pay all costs associated with the deal-making rather than picking up and 
moving elsewhere. 
 But the mere possibility of exit does not guarantee that signing a deal in fact 
signals the most preferential outcome.  First, as previously noted, the proponents of CBAs 
have deliberately targeted their organizing efforts towards a specific subset of sectors—
“sticky” industries—that by definition are geographically constrained.274  The Yale-New 
Haven Cancer Center CBA, for instance, evinced a deliberate choice on behalf of CCNE 
and its coalition partners to target an employer unable to benefit from interjurisdictional 
competition.  It seems obvious, too, that part of the strategy of negotiating a CBA with 
Achievement First was the understanding that the developer was necessarily constrained 
in its choices.  Achievement First was not hoping to start a new school in any of the 
                                                
271 See Camacho, supra note 254 at 364 (“the very existence of the CBA itself is evidence that every party 
believed it was better off with an agreement than without one.”). 
272 See supra note 183. 
273 See Vicki Been, “Exit” As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 473, 476 (1991) [hereinafter Exit] (summarizing arguments 
suggesting that a “primary source of discipline in the market” is a developer’s ability to “buy” its services 
from other jurisdictions); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 1-18 (2001) (arguing that 
because local government policies are capitalized into home values, local government decision-makers will 
craft policy choices that maximize homeowners’ willingness to remain in their jurisdiction).  
274 See discussion supra Part II.C.   
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surrounding suburban school districts; rather, it merely hoping to resituate its flagship 
from one facility within New Haven to another.275  That it elected to pursue negotiations 
with the alderwomen and CCNE, rather than seek alternative sites, may simply have 
reflected a belief that they were likely to encounter a CBA regardless of which 
neighborhood they selected as their preferred site.  
 At the same time, however, even the threat of a potential exit may have tempered 
the negotiations from the other parties to the CBA, forcing alders and other community 
leaders to evaluate the ramifications of the deal falling through.  When comparing the 
status quo and proposed uses from the perspective of neighbors and community-
members, it is difficult to imagine a concentrated majority of voices preferring a defunct 
“eyesore” of a school (used only as a polling site) to a fully active one, even if there were 
no explicit provisions for community use.  That the project would offer both short term 
and full time job opportunities, too—regardless of the prospect of a labor neutrality 
agreement—would likely have counseled the participating community members against 
pushing negotiations with Achievement First to a breaking point.276  
In addition, the possibility of exit should have weighed on the minds of the lead 
alderwomen, who would risk losing a buyer and foregoing the immediate fiscal gain of 
$1.5 million if Achievement First backed out of the deal.  The threat of deadweight loss 
resulting from a failed deal, in other words, should temper the negotiations in the mind of 
a savvy politician, given the sizeable sums involved.  Not only would she risk alienating 
the community members who viewed them as fair intermediaries; she may also risk 
                                                
275 By law, Amistad Academy draws its student body from the New Haven public school lottery system.  
See AMISTAD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 166 at 6; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-66bb (West 2013). 
276 Although CBA proponents generally target “sticky” industries that are less likely to relocate to other 
jurisdictions, see discussion supra part II.C, there may nevertheless remain an element of intrajurisdictional 
competition among neighborhoods. 
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losses in political clout among the Board and within the Mayor’s office, as both bodies 
indicated their interest in consummating the sale.  
A structural aspect of CBAs also militates in favor of optimal resource allocation: 
the incentive placed on negotiating coalitions to gather substantial data on neighborhood 
preferences.277  If outcomes can be optimized by reducing informational transaction 
costs—e.g, those costs associated with gathering information about the economic 
exchanges involved in a given deal—a process that improves information collection can 
ostensibly benefit allocative efficiency.278  As one scholar has pointed out, to the extent 
land use regulation is intended to protect current home values and consumer surplus, the 
most effective way to capture such information for land use decision-makers is through 
direct participation by residents themselves.279   
Without the substantial backing of a broad swath of the relevant community, a 
coalition seeking to negotiate a CBA with a developer lacks the necessary leverage to 
compel participation.  This leverage requirement, in turn, depends on the ability of 
community organizers to mobilize diverse constituencies and coalesce a unified 
negotiating platform.280  As Andrea van den Heever learned through her experience as a 
labor organizer in the 1990s, building and maintaining community coalitions requires a 
concerted and continuous effort by organizers to not only establish relationships, but to 
offer promises of tangible benefits that will resonate with grassroots and community-
                                                
277 See Karkkainen, supra note 261 at 84 (arguing that an ideal, participatory model of zoning would 
decrease the disproportionate influence of the concentrated interest groups—in other words, the Olsonian 
paradigm—towards one that more closely approximates a “median voter” model that is ostensibly more 
representative of neighborhood preferences).  
278 See FISCHEL, ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS, supra note 265 at 94. 
279 Karkkainen, supra note 261 at 83-84. 
280 See discussion supra Parts II.B and II.C.  
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based organizations.281  During the Yale-New Haven Cancer Center negotiations, CCNE 
assisted its community coalition (CORD) to develop and administer an extensive survey 
of neighborhood residents.  Armed with personal digital assistants, CORD organizers 
conducted weeks of door-to-door interviews, collecting extensive survey data from 
approximately 800 area residents.282   
Similarly, alderwoman Foskey Cyrus conducted a more low tech, informal door-
to-door survey during the course of the Newhallville-Amistad negotiations to get a “feel 
for the way the neighbors responded” to the proposed development.283  The process of 
proactively gathering and aggregating neighborhood preferences, therefore, may identify 
salient sources of aggravation or concern shared by large portions of the relevant 
community. 
Expansive as the information collection process may be—motivated by the 
prospect of greater leverage—the process is in no way constrained to limit the 
information gathered to economic information.  To the contrary, CBA negotiating 
coalitions have solicited neighborhood “preferences” relating to concerns that extend far 
beyond the standard trade-off inquiries related to land use concerns, such as impacts on 
home values, traffic, or the aesthetic impact of the proposed development.284  In the case 
of the CORD surveys in 2004, interviewers asked the survey participants not only about 
                                                
281 See id. 
282 See Gopinath, supra note 129 at 19-20 
283 Interview with Brenda Foskey-Cyrus, supra note 208. 
284 Compare FISCHEL, ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS, supra note 265 at 83-86 (depicting economic 
valuations associated with a proposed development through the framework of nuisance); with Patricia E. 
Salkin, Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits Agreements: Equitable Development, Social 
Justice and Other Considerations for Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26 UCLA 
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 291, 294 (2008) (noting that “[m]any CBA provisions are inspired by social justice 
concerns and desires of the coalition, including such things as: living-wage requirements, ‘first source’ (i.e. 
local) hiring and job training programs, minority hiring minimums, guarantees that developments will 
include low-income and affordable housing, environmental remediation requirements, and funding for 
community services and programs.”). 
 67 
their views on standard nuisance-like impacts (e.g., traffic and parking), but also about 
their views on whether or not hospital employees should be unionized, as well as how 
they perceived the hospital’s medical debt collection practices.285   Likewise, given the 
Newhallville-Amistad provisions relating to labor neutrality and workforce development 
funding, one can surmise that the organizers in Newhallville took a similarly expansive 
approach to gathering community preferences related to the ultimate outcome of the 
project. 
It is useful in this regard to compare a CBA negotiating coalition’s freedom to 
carry out wide-ranging and expansive information-collection with the constraints 
imposed on other land use bodies.  For instance, the information collection process in 
individualized land use decisions will typically be circumscribed by either the ultra vires 
principle or the Constitutionally-rooted exactions doctrine.  The former limits the criteria 
that zoning and other administrative bodies may rely on when reaching a land use 
decision.286   The latter, often referred to as “nexus” and “proportionality” requirements, 
limit local governments’ imposition of exactions without a tight fit between the 
concessions required by the developer and the impacts caused by the development.287 
Decisions made by legislative bodies are certainly less circumscribed (albeit not wholly 
                                                
285 See Gopinath, supra note 129 at 19-20. 
286 The ultra vires doctrine is closely related to non-delegation principle; a court will accord greater 
scrutiny to administrative decisions based on delegated authorities than they will to legislative decisions 
made by a democratically accountable political body.  See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 42 at 300.  See 
also Neighborhood Action Grp. v. Cnty. of Calaveras, 156 Cal. App. 3d 1176, 203 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Ct. App. 
1984) (holding a local permitting entity’s issuance of a conditional use permit to be ultra vires because the 
entity failed to ensure the CUP was consistent with the town’s comprehensive plan); Dinsmore Dev., Co., 
Inc. v. Cherokee Cnty., 260 Ga. 727, 728 (1990) (requiring the legislature to provide objective standards by 
which the administrative body may properly grant or deny a special exception).  
287 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 
374, 391 (1994).  Helpful commentary on the scrutiny imposed by the supreme court on land use exactions 
may be found in Matthew J. Cholewa & Helen L. Edmonds, Federalism and Land Use After Dolan: Has 
the Supreme Court Taken Takings from the States?, 28 URB. LAW. 401 (1996). 
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unconstrained).288  And the coalitions negotiating CBAs—at this point at least—are 
wholly untethered from any judicial scrutiny to ensure the decision-making process 
adheres to criteria and standards elaborated in a given state’s enabling land use 
legislation.289  
These judicial constraints may properly be thought to restrict land use decision-
makers not only in the substantive decisions that they reach, but also the information that 
they rely on to justify such decisions.  In the context of CBA negotiations, the 
expansiveness of information collection may certainly allow a coalition to derive deep 
consensus on a set of issues from among a broader array of possible land-related 
concerns.  But the effect of this consensus may very well frustrate and overwhelm 
landowners or property users who would be more acutely affected by a change in the 
status quo. 
CBA observers have realized that the tool carries with it two primary risks in this 
regard that are effectively two sides of the same coin: first, that the tool may be exploited 
by developers, who may seek to confer benefits on a hand-picked (and persuasive) set of 
community groups while marginalizing project opponents;290 and second, that the 
negotiating coalition’s selected interests are not representative of the interests of the 
broader community.291  As related to allocative efficiency, however, these criticisms miss 
a more significant point, which is that because negotiating coalitions are unconstrained in 
                                                
288 See Richard K. Norton, Who Decides, How, and Why? Planning for the Judicial Review of Local 
Legislative Zoning Decisions, 43 URB. LAW. 1085, 1099 (2011) (noting that courts typically review 
legislative decisions under a generous rational basis standard of review).  But see Fasano v. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs of Washington Cnty, 507 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Or. 1973) (en banc) (requiring stricter scrutiny of 
legislative rezonings, characterizing such decisions as “quasi-judicial” in character and thus lacking in the 
presumption of validity traditionally accorded to legislative acts). 
289 See Gross, supra note 65 at 47 (noting that the “typical private CBA does not implicate the laws that 
constrain local governments” given that the CBA does not involve government action).   
290 See Gross (id. definitions, values) at 37. 
291 See Been, CBAs supra note 31 at 23. 
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their information collection process, they may very well capture points of agreement that 
are highly representative of the broader community, but drown out highly-valued 
preferences of a smaller subset of community members—typically those of adjacent 
property owners.292 
In this sense, then, the ultimate efficiency of the outcome (still speaking in 
Kaldor-Hicks terms) may turn on the ability of decision-makers to accurately capture the 
distinct variations in price that particular neighbors may feel about the project.  A 
neighbor who is adjacent to the school, for instance, may view the change in the status 
quo as a decidedly negative outcome, absent remedial actions on the part of the city or 
the developer.  The proposal offered by the Greater New Haven Clergy Association 
(GNHCA) fits the mold; all of the organization’s proposed conditions consisted of 
focused, specific requests that almost exclusively sought to remediate the disutility of the 
development on its proximate neighbors: parking demands; limits on the timing of school 
activities (so as to ensure the “peace and tranquility” of the neighborhood), additional 
garbage cans, limitations on lighting, privacy fences, and public access to school 
facilities.293  With the exception of public access, none of these requested conditions 
would inure to the benefit of the community outside of a very small geographic radius.  
In contrast, the CBA that was ultimately signed included no remedial measures for 
                                                
292 Note that this problem can be conceived of as the inverse of the standard “Olsonian” framework, under 
which concentrated interests groups, like adjacent neighbors, may overwhelm the preferences of more 
diffuse consumer groups who are less immediately affected by a given decision.  See MANCUR OLSON,THE 
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 1-18 (1965); Roderick J. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the 
“Zoning Budget”, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81, 86 (2011) (defining proximally neighbors as the 
“paradigmatic ‘Olsonian interest group’”) [hereinafter Balancing the Zoning Budget]. 
293 See GNHCA Dec. 11 Press Release, supra note 244. 
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proximate neighbors, with almost all of the benefits flowing either to the wider 
Newhallville neighborhood or the community of New Haven at large.294 
Assuming, for a moment, that the GNHCA’s proposal accurately represents the 
preferences of all adjacent neighbors, the deal should go through only if (a) the developer 
is willing to compensate the neighbors for the disutilty of the development (either by 
remediating the externalities or by offering a direct contribution as compensation); or (b) 
the utility gains felt by the broader neighbors outweigh the disutility experienced by the 
immediate neighbors.  While it may be feasible for the developer to meet both sets of 
demands, the developer will likely seek to cabin its costs by preferencing a deal that will 
maximize gains (reducing the risk of non-approval by ensuring the widest and most vocal 
support in favor of the project) with the lowest cost (e.g., the payments or contributions 
necessary to secure such support).   
An optimistic take on the CBA is that it may help grease the wheels in bypassing 
the traditional Olsonian public choice concern over tyranny of the minority.  Under the 
standard Olsonian model, a small, vocal, self-interested minority group has not only the 
wherewithal to protest an adverse land decision, but often succeeds in doing so, owing to 
the collective-action failures associated with gathering positive community voices within 
the broader community.295  The minoritarian preference may, in turn, result in inefficient 
outcomes.296  By remedying the collective action failure of the broader community, the 
                                                
294 See 580 DIXWELL LAND DISPOSITION AGREEMENT, Exhibit B supra note 156. 
295 See, e.g., Hills & Schleicher, Balancing the Zoning Budget, supra note 292 at 92 (illustrating the 
stereotypical differences between the well-situated homeowners and the “theoretical, distant” beneficiaries 
of development). 
296 See A. Daniel Tarlock, An Economic Analysis of Direct Voter Participation in Zoning Change, 1 UCLA 
J. ENVT’L L. & POL’Y 31, 46 (1980). 
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CBA effectively counters the often-decisive influence of minority voices in forestalling 
efficient development outcomes.297  
But if the more diffuse preferences of the broader community are priced at a 
minimal value and the adjacent neighbors’ preferences are priced high, it may well be the 
case that the CBA allows for approval of a project where total costs exceed total 
benefits.298  The developer would certainly be paying a price for receiving development 
approval, but the price paid would not accurately capture the marginal social costs of the 
development on those most directly affected by it.299   Contrary to the dysfunctional 
portrait of zoning decisions as being disproportionately controlled by the tyranny of a 
highly vocal, mobilized, and self-interested minority—which, due to NIMBYism or other 
reasons, tends to inhibit efficient outcomes by stifling development, or shift the social 
costs to more disorganized interest groups300—the CBA process appears vulnerable to the 
criticism that it disproportionately drowns out such important voices, erasing what would 
                                                
297 In the case of 580 Dixwell, if the GNHCA’s proposal serves to guide our understanding of the 
concentrated preferences of the minority, it may very well be that the “tyranny” of the majority may not 
have foreclosed development completely, but rather would have required particular compensation as a 
condition of support—compensation that, but for the CBA, may have been easily forthcoming from 
Achievement First.  The plot was, after all, already a school—and it would be hard to believe that adjacent 
neighbors would so vastly prefer the status quo over the proposed use.   
298 Such an outcome would not satisfy even the minimal demands of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, let alone the 
possibility of a Pareto-efficient outcome.  The CBA, then, may be viewed as tool that has the potential to 
excessively enhance, rather than check, majoritarian bias in a given dispute.  Cf. NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S 
LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMANDS OF RIGHTS 73 (2001).  
299 See T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization of Spatial 
Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 348-52 (1990) [hereinafter Integrating Land-Value Taxation].  Some 
have levied similar accusations over the participation of then-councilman Bill de Blasio in the multi-million 
dollar CBA negotiated as part of the Atlantic Yards development in Brooklyn, New York.  One of the 
leaders of a community group opposed to the development expressed that de Blasio “never criticized the 
deeply flawed process that gifted a complete zoning override and 22 acres of valuable Brooklyn real estate 
to a single developer without any vote or any bidding process.”  See Dana Rubenstien, Bill de Blasio, 
Development Pragmatist, CAPITAL (Aug 30, 2013).  Rubenstein notes that the developer’s promise to 
provide union-construction jobs and 2,000 units of below-market housing was what secured de Blasio’s 
support, notwithstanding substantial neighborhood opposition to the project.  Id. 
300 See, e.g., Hills & Schleicher, Balancing the Zoning Budget, supra note 292 at 92-93; Karkkainen, supra 
note 261 at 56-57.  
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otherwise be reasonable demands for compensation in the service of gaining rents for a 
more diffuse constituency of voters.  
Several scholars who have studied direct voter participation in zoning processes 
have noted the challenges associated with weighting the preferences (influenced by the 
perceived costs) of different community constituencies in the zoning process.  Nicolaus 
Tideman, for instance, proposed a vote-weighting system tied loosely to a given voter’s 
geographic proximity to a proposed development.301  Tideman recognized that when a 
broad community of individuals participates in site-specific land use decisions, there is a 
decided risk of inefficient outcomes when the majority of participants favor the use, but 
the adjacent landowners most acutely experience the costs of the project’s externalities 
with limited compensation based on the amenities produced by the project.302 
In the case of the Newhallville-Amistad CBA, the process was designed 
specifically to draw out broad consensus on what types of benefits the project should 
offer, but with little regard to the immediate impact of the projects on those most likely to 
experience a discrepancy between, on one hand, the amenities produced by the project 
along with the benefits secured by the CBA, and on the other, the direct externalities 
experienced as a result of being located close to the school.  Thus, while the CBA 
information collection process may be adept at capturing the most salient points of 
                                                
301 See Integrating Land Value Taxation, at 353.  Tideman proposes two possible methods of improving on 
the “majority rule” default option in land use regulation: (a) weighted voting (with weighting based on the 
projected discrepancy between the presumed benefits and presumed costs that each neighbor would receive 
as a result of the project); and (b) a demand-revealing process, which would force neighbors to generate a 
price they would be willing to pay to either have the development approved or rejected (with whatever side 
wins having to pay the promised sum).  As Professor Dan Tarlock has noted with regards to Tideman’s 
weighting proposal, “the beauty of the Tideman solution is that the appealing democratic idea of consent 
ordinances, in which people directly express their preferences, can be combined with efficiency promoting 
constraints to insure that voting schemes do not simply become an occasion for one group to shift the costs 
of amenity production to another group.”  See Tarlock, supra note 296 at 44 (commenting specifically on 
the first iteration of this concept in Tideman’s unpublished Ph.D. dissertation).  
302 See id. at 350. 
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agreement among a large number of community members, it appears a poor vehicle for 
sorting and ranking the price preferences associated with both benefits and externalities.  
A community may appear unified in its support for demanding a living wage guarantee 
from a developer.  But without pricing and aggregating that preference, and ranking it 
against the prices placed on the project’s disutility, the CBA process may bias widely-
shared preferences (regardless of price) over narrow (but highly valued) preferences 
related to parking mitigation, use restrictions, or requirements that the school install and 
manage trash receptacles.  In terms of transaction costs, this eases the costs associated 
with the former constituency, while increasing the friction associated with the latter.  
Surely, the allegations levied by the GNHCA—that the group was physically 
barred from participation in the final negotiations303—only adds to the concern that the 
ultimate agreement may not have resulted in an efficient allocation of development 
rights.  For although the incentives of the CBA require broad participation, the CBA is 
not effectively designed to assess, balance, or mediate between competing neighborhood 
preferences when only a fixed amount of benefits may be extracted from a developer.  In 
the end, however, the GNHCA tempered its obstreperousness, and while Rev. Boise 
Kimber vocally registered his dissent during the final hearing before the Board of 
Alderman, the GNHCA—for whatever reason—decided not to seek additional 
concessions from Achievement First, either by attempting to negotiate a side-deal, or by 
seeking its very own CBA on behalf of a constituency not well-represented in the deal 
brokered by CCNE and the two Newhallville alderwomen.304   
 
C. Procedural Fairness 
                                                
303 See GNHCA Dec. 11 Press Release, supra note 244.  
304 See Interview with Rev. Newman, supra note 226. 
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For several weeks now we have been warning that the process to sell the vacant 
Martin Luther King School on Dixwell Avenue was an anti-democratic closed 
process that essentially shut out the people most affected by the sale, the 
neighbors who live adjacent to the site. […] The mystery behind all of the 
clandestine closed-to-the-public meetings is that the union funded Connecticut 
Center for a New Economy (CCNE) has been running the show since the summer.  
Achievement First, the unions AFSCME and UNITE HERE, and Alderwomen 
Fosky-Cyrus and Clyburn were all there behind the closed and union guarded 
doors. There has been no sign of the neighbors.305 
 
The anger and vitriol of the GNHCA in the wake of the December 5 meetings 
between Achievement First and the negotiating coalition pointedly captures the concern 
that many scholars have voiced regarding the possibility of process-based failures in the 
course of negotiating a CBA.  Specifically, that the private nature of the agreement limits 
the ability of outside bodies to oversee and regulate on not only the “what” but the “how” 
of the negotiation process.  That CBAs may, in practice, fail to adhere to the objective 
ideals of transparency, inclusiveness of participation, and representativeness in 
negotiations, has been one of the instrument’s most well documented criticisms.306  Julian 
Gross, a major champion of CBAs, has gone so far as to propose a definition of CBAs 
that “would limit its use to describing agreements that reflect the essential values of past 
CBAs: inclusiveness and accountability.”307  Although Gross proposes that any 
“agreement or document that does not replicate these key attributes…should not gain 
                                                
305 GNHCA Dec. 11 Press Release, supra note 244. 
306 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 65 at 37-40; Been, CBAs supra note 31 at 21-24, 32-33; Julian Gross, et al, 
Community Benefits Agreements: Making Development Projects Accountable 21-22 (Good Jobs First and 
the California Partnership for Working Families, May 2005), online at 
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/cba2005final.pdf (visited Nov 21, 2013). 
307 Gross, supra note 65 at 36.  Gross writes that “encouraging careful use of the term CBA is much more 
than an abstract, academic effort.  As is vividly illustrated by recent New York processes [e.g., the Bronx 
Terminal Market CBA, the Yankee Stadium agreement, and the Columbia University agreement], the CBA 
concept is at risk of being co-opted and utilized to develop support for controversial projects, without 
providing the independent legal enforcement rights and community engagement that are hallmarks of 
successful CBAs.”  Id.  
 75 
credibility from association with them,”308 the reality is that there exists, at this stage, no 
external mechanism to ensure that CBAs adequately adhere to these ideals.  Nevertheless, 
champions of CBAs continue to extol their virtues as flexible, participatory, and inclusive 
land use devices that improve upon the government-run status quo.309 
Because CBAs (a) have been engineered specifically to avoid the preemptive 
force of the National Labor Relations Act, and, as a result (b) entrust private coalitions 
with the authority to enforce the agreement, they are uniquely situated to receive all the 
upside benefits of judicial review (contract enforcement) while avoiding any downside 
risk of judicial review (no process-based review of private contract negotiations).  In 
short, linguistic constraints may, at this point, be the only method of ensuring CBAs are 
negotiated without derogating from the values guaranteed by an administrative process 
checked by judicial review.  While CBAs may offer certain participatory advantages over 
the standard regulatory analogues, the Newhallville-Amistad CBA illustrates how process 
values may also be undermined by the methods through which negotiating committees 
gain and maintain leverage over developers.  
 
1. Process Values 
 
Where a government, by its decision, seeks to impose land-related costs on 
property owners on a parcel-by-parcel basis, the Supreme Court has demanded certain 
minimum procedural guarantees to satisfy the demands of Constitutional due process.  
Two analogous property tax decisions in the early part of the 20th century framed the 
                                                
308 Id.  See also Steven P. Frank, Note, Yes In My Backyard: Developers, Government, and Communities 
Working Together Through Development Agreements and Community Benefit Agreements, 42 IND. L. REV. 
227, 252-53 (2009). 
309 See, e.g., Marcello, supra note 67 (“CBA negotiations can restore a measure of balance [in the public 
planning process] by empowering the community to participate meaningfully in the planning process 
through a direct dialogue with developers”). 
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Court’s approach to procedural due process, articulating a framework through which 
procedural guarantees increase in inverse relationship with the granularity of a particular 
government decision-making process.  In Londoner v. Denver, 310 the Court held that due 
process entitled property owners disputing a particular tax assessment not only to notice 
and an opportunity to submit objections in writing, but also an opportunity to be heard in 
some form of individuated adjudicatory process.311  In contrast, where a tax assessment 
was levied equally upon all property owners within a municipality, as in Bi-Metallic 
Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,312 the due process clause did not furnish all 
individuals with a constitutional guarantee of a right to be heard in matters “in which all 
are equally concerned.”313   
Translating these rough contours of procedural due process314 into the 
particularities of land use regulation, scholars have understood several important interests 
to be buttressed by process-based requirements.  In addition to helping facilitate an 
                                                
310 210 U.S. 373 (1908). 
311 Id. At 385-86. 
312 239 U.S. 441 (1915).  
313 Id. at 445.  The Court in Bi-Metallic contrasts its decision in Londoner, noting that in that case “a 
relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon 
individual grounds, and it was held that they had a right to a hearing.”  Id. at 446.  Note that what process is 
due may shift depending on whether the decision-making is characterized as “legislative,” “adjudicative,” 
or “quasi-judicial” in character.  See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 42 at 358 (describing different 
jurisdictional approaches to extending cross-examination rights for participants in zoning hearings). 
314 Over the ensuing century, the Court filled out the meat of the procedural due process analysis, 
identifying specific indicators that the Court viewed as suggestive of reasonable or reliable decision-
making.  At its core, this included “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the 
case.”  Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“An essential principle of due 
process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case.’” (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 
306, 313 (1950)). The constitutional floor of due process appeared to require, at a minimum, adequate 
notice, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976), appropriate timing of the hearing, see 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), and impartiality of the decision maker, see  
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).  However, Matthews altered the method by which due 
process requirements would be evaluated by pitting the individual’s interest in a particular entitlement 
against the public interest in accurate adjudication and the administrative costs of such accuracy, along with 
the likelihood of erroneous deprivations of the given interest that might be effected with inadequate 
procedural guarantees.  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
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efficient outcome, process values also regard as significant the representational and 
dignitary interests of both landowners and interested neighbors.315  Impressing upon 
citizens a sense that the decision has been achieved in a fair manner, process increases the 
political legitimacy of the body issuing the decision and increases the acceptability of the 
result.316  In some circumstances, states have written specific procedural requirements 
into state and local zoning acts that exceed the constitutional floor of due process.317  And 
numerous local ordinances specify the procedures and criteria by which more flexibile 
land use decisions—such as development agreements and conditional zoning schemes—
are to be finalized.318 
Professors Mandelker and Tarlock argue that judicial review of the procedural 
guarantees present in any given decision may serve as a reliable criterion for gauging the 
“reasonableness” of that decision.319  Specifically, a “process-based approach” to judicial 
review of local land use decisions may help “ensure that decision makers do the two 
things that are most likely to suffer in community politics: careful consideration of the 
relationship between individual decisions and the future form and composition of the 
community and particular attention to voices most likely to be ignored in the 
                                                
315 Developments in the Law—Zoning and Procedural Due Process, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1502, 1505 (1978) 
(“The representational function…relates due process directly to the substantive rules of decision by 
promoting debate over the merits and correct interpretation of the rules themselves, [whereas…] the dignity 
function is not concerned with the individual's right to argue for a different outcome in his particular case. 
Instead, participation is required because human dignity mandates consultation with an individual prior to 
taking any action vitally affecting his interests.”) 
316 James M. Kahn, In Accordance With a Constitutional Plan: Procedural Due Process and Zoning 
Decisions, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1011, 1026 (1979). 
317 See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 42 at 358.   
318 See Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development 
Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 986-
88, 1009-1014 (1987). 
319 Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land Use Law, 
24 URB. LAW. 1, 10 (1992).   
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representative government.”320  Where citizens perceive their interests are at stake, 
expressing those preferences—either directly in the form of testimony at hearings, or 
indirectly through the ballot box—is an act at the core of democratic processes.321 
Whether CBAs enhance, detract from, or otherwise furnish process values 
analogous to those provided under a government-supervised regulatory process may help 
inform the evaluation of CBAs as a tool designed to achieve responsible development 
outcomes.322  But before undertaking such an analysis, a brief discursion into federal 
labor law and the engineering of CBAs is in order. 
 
2. Labor Law and the Structural Incentives of CBAs 
 
Two attributes of modern labor law—namely, an incredibly broad federal 
preemption scheme,323 and labor law’s sanctioning of (and willingness to enforce) private 
ordering between labor and management—have both motivated and made feasible 
several of the innovative leverage and bargaining strategies of the modern labor 
movement.  The breadth of federal labor preemption as interpreted by the Supreme Court 
has effectively barred all but the most minute of state and municipal experimentation in 
the area of labor-management relations.324  Labor scholars have long condemned this 
                                                
320 Id.  In practice, many regulatory decisions are highly discretionary and frequently unpredictable, which 
has resulted in numerous calls for procedural reforms in state zoning legislation.  See, e.g., Daniel R. 
Mandelker, Model Legislation for Land Use Decisions, 35 URB. LAW. 635, 635 (2003). 
321 See Been, CBAs supra note 31 at 21 (discussing the importance of democratic electoral politics as an 
important check on the accountability of local decision makers).   
322 For an analysis of whether CBAs promote efficient land use decisions, see discussion supra Part IV.B. 
323 See, e.g., Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Law Preemption Doctrine 
to Allow the States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L. REV. 97 (2009); Cynthia L. Estlund, 
The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002); Michael H. Gottesman, 
Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355 (1990); 
Eileen Silverstein, Against Preemption in Labor Law, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
324 See Sachs, supra note 132 at 1164-69; Robert Rachal, Machinists Preemption Under the NLRA: A 
Powerful Tool to Protect an Employer’s Freedom to Bargain, 58 La. L. Rev. 1065, 1066-67 (1998).  There 
are three primary zones of preemption under federal labor law.  First, Garmon preemption grants exclusive 
jurisdiction to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to hear disputes over “unfair labor practices” 
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state of affairs, noting that the expansiveness of federal preemption has curtailed 
progressive local solutions to a failed federal labor regime—a regime that insufficiently 
protects collective bargaining rights and, more recently, has failed to keep pace with the 
shifting dynamics of an increasingly knowledge-driven economy.325 
In response to these perceived failures, unions developed the concept of 
“comprehensive” or “corporate” campaigns, seeking to link particular union organizing 
goals with policy goals or reform objectives of interest to a broader community outside of 
the immediate workforce.326  The union first identifies ways in which a target employer 
might be subject to control by external regulatory forces—for instance, workplace safety 
issues, environmental compliance, or compliance with permitting or zoning laws.  By 
forming alliances with a particular coalition of interested activists, the union exerts 
                                                                                                                                            
arising between labor and management.  See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 
245 (1959).  Second, Machinists preemption is based on the presumption that Congress intended to leave 
the field of much of labor-management relations to the “free play of economic forces.”  Lodge 76, 
International Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Committee, 427 U.S. 132, 140 
(1976) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  As such, the Court interpreted the NLRA to preempt 
states and local governments from regulating union activity.  Third, federal common law displaces state law 
when federal courts interpret the contractual provisions of a collective bargaining agreement (or any other 
agreement falling under the auspices of § 301 of the LMRA).  See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln 
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 368 (1990).   
325 See Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 376-77 (2007).  Sachs 
describes the innovations of the modern labor movement as resulting from an inflexible, rigid, and ossified 
legal regime that blocks the traditional methods of collective bargaining.  Id. at 377. One of the new forms 
of labor law, he argues, is through private negotiated agreements, id. at 380-82, which he believes are 
“[o]ften (inaccurately) grouped together under the moniker of ‘neutrality and card check agreements,’” id. 
at 378. 
326 See, e.g., CHARLES R. PERRY, UNION CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS (1987); JASON WILLIAM COULTER, THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF UNION CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS (1997) (unpublished dissertation); Charlotte 
Garden, Labor Values Are First Amendment Values: Why Union Comprehensive Campaigns Are Protected 
Speech, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617, 2621-23 (2011); Herbert R. Northrup & Charles H. Steen, Union 
“Corporate Campaigns” as Blackmail: The RICO Battle at Bayou Steel, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771 
(1999).  Garden describes three particular ways in which these campaigns differ from traditional labor 
organizing tactics: “[f]irst, they move the locus of the dispute from the plant floor or the picket line out into 
the community and sometimes across state and national borders.  Second, they involve both labor unions 
and other community, religious, and activist organizations and thus rally a broad base of support that goes 
beyond labor’s immediate constituency.  Third, they move away from traditional labor rhetoric and include 
the concerns of the civil rights, environmental, and consumer protection movements, among others, which 
sometimes conveys the impression that those organizations—and not the labor union—are the driving force 
behind the various rallies, press releases, and other campaign events.”  Garden, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. at 
2622. 
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pressure on such regulatory bodies to increase scrutiny on the employer.  As labor scholar 
James Brudney has observed, the union thus “either on its own or with its allies, seeks to 
exert regulatory pressure on the target company by advocating for or initiating agency 
action addressed to actual or reasonably believed company violations of federal 
occupational safety, environmental, or securities laws, and of state or local zoning 
laws.”327   
To gain leverage, the labor groups make clear their willingness to abandon or 
relent in their advocacy efforts, contingent upon the employer’s willingness to participate 
in a private agreement with the union—typically requiring the employer to agree to a 
method of organizing that departs from the NLRA-sanctioned method of secret ballot 
elections supervised by the NRLB.328  Provided the pressure is sufficient to entice the 
employer to capitulate, any private agreement negotiated between the union and 
employer is binding and enforceable in federal court under section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA).329  Such agreements, however, must remain 
                                                
327 James J. Brudney, Collateral Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against Union 
Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 731, 743 (2010); see also PERRY, supra note 326, at 39-48.  
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“neutral” during a union organizing campaign; (b) that the employer will refrain from demanding NLRB 
supervision of the campaign; and (c) that the employer will recognize the union if a simple majority of the 
union employees sign a card authorizing the union to negotiate on the employee’s behalf.  Compare 
Brudney, supra note 37 (arguing in favor of neutrality and card check on both normative and legal 
grounds); and Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union 
Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655 (2010); with Cynthia Estlund, Freeing Employee Choice: The Case 
For Secrecy In Union Organizing And Voting, 123 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 10, 15-20 (2010) (elaborating on 
and discussing concerns raised by critics of card check that indicate the “cajoling” of individual employees 
at the moment of signing an authorization card may pose issues associated with employee’s freedom to 
choose whether or not to support union organizing efforts).  
329 Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187).  The LMRA amended the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 
(NLRA) to include section 301, which gave federal district courts jurisdiction to hear suits “for violation 
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exclusively private—and any participation by a state or local government body in the 
agreement risks the possibility that, if litigated, the agreement may be preempted as an 
impermissible interference by state and local authorities on the exclusive field of federal 
labor law.330   
 Community Benefits Agreements are merely one species within the broader 
genus of corporate campaigns.  Motivated by a need to circumvent the ossified federal 
labor regime, unions focus on the chokepoint of land use permitting and rezoning 
processes, leveraging their ability to mobilize either mass support for or mass protest 
against an employer’s desired land use proposal to secure a collateral benefit: more 
favorable rules with which to engage in union organizing.331  From a structural 
perspective, CBA proponents have crafted the instrument to dodge the federal labor law 
preemption regime.   
By making clear that one subset of the union’s conditions are a necessary 
predicate for union support (namely, a private agreement defining the rules of a particular 
union organizing effort), but excluding such sub-agreements from the four corners of the 
                                                                                                                                            
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees…”  29 U.S.C. § 185(a) 
(2006).  See also Andrew M. Kramer, Lee E. Miller & Leonard Bierman, Neutrality Agreements: The New 
Frontier in Labor Relations—Fair Play or Foul?, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 39, 59-63 (1981); Sachs, supra note 132 
at 1170-71; Laura J. Cooper, Privatizing Labor Law: Neutrality/Card Check Agreements and the Role of 
the Arbitrator, 83 Ind. L.J. 1589, 1612-13 (2008). 
330 See supra note 324 and accompanying text.  It is worth noting, too, that under recent NLRB precedent, a 
public charter may, like a private employer, be governed by the provisions of the NLRA and LMRA.  See 
Chi. Math. & Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. 41 (Dec. 14, 2012) (holding that a public charter 
school, operated by a charter management organization, was not a political subdivision or instrumentality 
under the NLRA).  As such, the provisions of federal labor laws that sanction private ordering may apply 
with equal force to public charter schools.  The precedential value of this decision, however, has been 
called into question by the D.C. Circuit’s recent opinion in Noel Canning v. N.L.R.B., 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (U.S. 2013). 
331 See Sachs, supra note 132 at 1179-80 (describing community benefits agreements as “tripartite” labor 
lawmaking, through which unions leverage the “benefit” of a regulatory decision favorable to the employer 
in exchange for a private union-employer agreement on union organizing); Gross, supra note 65 at 38 
(noting that “community groups have only one real source of leverage in CBA negotiations: their ability to 
publicly support or oppose a proposed project.”).  
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CBA itself, unions achieve two key objectives.  First, the union-employer agreement 
enforceable under section 301 of the LMRA.  Second, the agreement is not voidable on 
grounds of federal preemption.332  In addition, the growing trend of “private” CBAs (as 
opposed to rolling the negotiated benefits into public development agreements) enables 
the negotiating coalition, rather than the local government, to leverage the enforcement 
power of courts to police the agreements for any breach by the developer.  Uniquely, a 
CBA enables a union to evade judicial review of the mechanisms used to negotiate a 
CBA, while nevertheless using the threat of judicial review—on behalf of the broad set of 
CBA beneficiaries—to ensure enforcement of the terms of the CBA itself.   
 
3. The Newhallville-Amistad CBA and Process Values 
 
The Newhallville-Amistad negotiations—along with the controversy that clouded 
the CBA’s conclusion—illustrate both the advantages and structural risks that CBAs may 
pose to “process-values.”  Of course, many of the factors present in this particular 
negotiation are context dependent, such as the domination of labor-backed politicians in 
New Haven’s board of aldermen,333 and the fact that alderwoman representing the 
affected ward also happened to serve as head of the relevant aldermanic subcommittee.334  
Nevertheless, the shape and trajectory of the negotiations are sufficiently filled in to 
evaluate whether, in fact, “the CBA negotiation process helps to address [the problems of 
seeking and responding to community input, particularly for marginalized communities] 
                                                
332 See Sachs, supra note 132 at 1203 n.260 (noting that, in the case of the Yale-New Haven Cancer Center 
agreement, the development agreement negotiated with the city “was silent with respect to the union-
employer agreement on organizing rights,” and that, similarly, the Hollywood and Highland Development 
Agreement specifically enumerated the benefit commitments that would flow from developer to the 
community, but excluded any discussion of the negotiated card check and neutrality commitments).   
333 See Meyerson, supra note 229; Paul Bass, For New Majority, Campaign’s Just Beginning, NEW HAVEN 
INDEP. (Nov. 25, 2011) (reporting that Brenda Foskey-Cyrus and Delphine Clyburn were two out of 18 
successful candidates for aldermanic seats backed by UNITE-HERE locals 34 and 35).  
334 See supra Part III.  
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by providing a forum for many interests in an affected community to be addressed 
through real, substantive, detailed negotiations a process not remotely replicated in public 
hearings or through the media.”335 
From the perspective of community engagement, it can hardly be doubted that the 
additional meetings organized by the Newhallville alderwomen—in concert with CCNE 
and Achievement First—augmented the nominal notice and hearing requirements 
mandated by New Haven’s municipal charter for enacting municipal orders.336  Over the 
six-month period leading up to the December 17, 2012 vote before the Board of 
Aldermen, alderwomen Foskey-Cyrus and Clyburn admirably canvassed the 
neighborhood, not only soliciting individual feedback on the nature of the project, but 
also encouraging individuals to show up to Community Management Team meetings in 
which the broad outlines of the CBA began to take shape.337  Because a coalition’s 
influence depends on its ability to gather and organize a broad swath of community 
voices,338 the proactive nature of these solicitations portends well for ensuring all 
potential adverse effects of the development are raised, aired, and discussed within a 
                                                
335 Gross, supra note 65 at 38 (noting that “laws concerning public notice and participation are sometimes 
poorly enforced, and official public hearings are often held during the workday”);  see also Camacho, 
supra note 254 at 360 (discussing the inadequacy of the current “bilateral negotiation process” between 
developers and local governments, and its failure to legitimate land use decisions by involving a broader set 
of affected stakeholders). 
336 See NEW HAVEN, CONN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, tit. 1, Art. IX., § 41 (Municode 2013) (“All ordinances 
shall be submitted to the board of aldermen, referred to and reported by a suitable committee after public 
hearing, printed in the journal for a first reading, and enacted upon second reading which shall take place at 
least one week after the first reading. The second reading of ordinances cannot be waived or dispensed 
with. All other measures (resolutions, votes, orders) shall follow the same procedure for legislative action 
as ordinances, except that, upon unanimous consent, immediate action may be taken, or upon receipt of a 
special message from the mayor declaring that the measure is of an emergency nature and that immediate 
action is necessary, the second reading may take place upon the same day as the original reading, and the 
printing of the same dispensed with.”).  
337 Interview with Reshma Singh (Oct. 2013), supra note 201; interview with Brenday Foskey-Cyrus, supra 
note 208. 
338 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 65 at 38; Frank, supra note 308 at 253-54. 
 84 
broader community of stakeholders—especially those voices not well represented by 
minoritarian special interests.339  
Nevertheless, several red flags were raised during the course of the negotiations 
over 580 Dixwell, casting doubt on the perceived fairness, representativeness, and 
transparency of the bargaining process.  First and foremost, arguably one of the 
fundamental conditions proffered by labor interests was excluded from the agreement: 
the labor neutrality and card check agreement for security and cafeteria workers.340  As 
was the case with the Yale-New Haven Cancer Center CBA, a core concession required 
by labor interests to secure their support was eliminated from the document 
formalizing—for public consumption and comment—the scope of the agreement.341  The 
mere fact of its exclusion, even if motivated predominantly by the goal of avoiding 
NLRA preemption,342 undermines the claim that the CBA negotiation process either 
improves upon or replicates analogous transparency requirements demanded by 
governmental processes.  To make matters worse, the school’s agreement to grant 
$150,000 in support of “youth enrichment” programs—arguably one of the costliest 
elements of the deal—was similarly excluded from the final, public LDA.  Finally, public 
                                                
339 See supra note 288 and accompanying text.  But see Musil, supra note 35 at 847 (analyzing results of a 
survey of community members who had previously participated in a CBA between 2000 and 2010, noting 
that “[s]urvey participants did not demonstrate uniform ratings of how CBAs improve the development 
process” and that, “with the exception of the assurance of zoning changes for the project, the responses had 
high levels of variance.  The responses to this question in the survey betray the community activism in the 
CBA and organizing literature that promotes the benefits of CBAs. Respondents clearly did not strongly 
agree on the specifics of how CBAs improve development.”)  Nevertheless, when asked how CBAs 
improve the development process, respondents most frequently answered: “increases public participation 
on development outcomes.”  Id.   
340 See MacMillan, supra note 250 (reporting that “custodial and cafeteria workers will be unionized” at the 
new school as part of the deal); Interview with Reshma Singh (Oct. 15, 2012), supra note 201 (confirming 
the existence of the neutrality and card check agreement); 580 DIXWELL LAND DISPOSITION AGREEMENT, 
supra note 156 (the formal documents filed with the municipality make no mention of the neutrality and 
card check agreement).    
341 See Sachs, supra note 132; note 332 and accompanying text. 
342 See supra note 332 and accompanying text.  
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copies of the agreement were not available until December 17, well after the deal had 
been solidified among the negotiating parties.343 
From the perspective of transparency ex post, unless a particular condition is 
included in the final CBA (which in this case was appended as an annex to the land 
disposition agreement), its existence is effectively written out of the public record.  For 
CBAs that are sanctioned or otherwise approved by public officials, any such omission is 
problematic.  Electoral consequences that may flow from a given alder’s vote on the land 
disposition agreement is likely to be evaluated only by what is in the record; deals that 
are only “informally” part of the CBA negotiations—existing merely in the penumbras of 
the final product—provide no assistance for voters seeking to hold government officials 
to account for their policy choices.   
Additionally, the disappearance of these conditions undermines transparency ex 
ante by making it appear that these conditions are not part of the comprehensive package.  
By making clear to the developer that these conditions are, in effect, the table ante 
necessary to begin negotiations, the interest groups supporting these conditions make 
them non-negotiable sub silentio.  Unlike the other benefits that are publicly documented, 
any debate over the inclusion or exclusion of these specific benefits in the final package 
is unlikely to be held in any truly public setting.    
A second, and related, concern is the representativeness of the negotiating 
committee—both during the negotiations and after the fact.  The final negotiating 
committee for the “public” elements of the CBA comprised eight signatories—two of 
whom were the alders from Ward 20 and 21, with the remainder consisting of individuals 
                                                
343 See supra notes 238-247 and accompanying text.  
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who were “members of the community.”344  News reports, however, indicated that other 
individuals who were not signatories to the agreement played a key role in the 
negotiations.  For instance, Barbara Vereen, an organizer for UNITE-HERE Local 34 and 
volunteer for CCNE345 reported to media shortly after the final meeting on December 3, 
2012, that she had been a continuous presence throughout the six months of 
negotiations.346  Yet her name is conspicuously absent from any of the public documents 
contained within the LDA.  Additionally, while CCNE sought to minimize its role in 
negotiations,347 a CCNE staff member eventually confirmed in a written statement that 
CCNE was involved in the negotiations, but only because Achievement First refused to 
sign a CBA with an unincorporated organization.348  Whether this justification was true at 
the time, neither CCNE (as a corporate entity) nor any member of CCNE was included as 
a signatory to the executed CBA appended to the disposition agreement.  
Whether or not the negotiations were compromised by the participation of 
individuals with overt interests in a particular outcome, the omission of these individuals 
from the public record has clear risks.  As has been noted by courts scrutinizing land use 
                                                
344 Interview with Brenda Foskey-Cyrus, supra note 208; 580 DIXWELL LAND DISPOSITION AGREEMENT, 
supra note 156. 
345 See Melissa Bailey, New Faces Fuel 9 Primaries, New Haven Indep. (Feb 3, 2012); Structure, UNITE-
HERE LOCAL 34, http://local34.org/structure/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2013). 
346 See Bass, supra note 245.  
347 See Achievement First and Newhallville Are Showing Our City How Development Can Benefit 
Everyone, CONNECTICUT CENTER FOR A NEW ECONOMY (Dec. 19, 2012) (depicting the agreement as being 
negotiated between Achievement First and the “Newhallville community,” and reporting only that CCNE 
“will review the agreement annually and provide a written report to the parties”). 
348 See Thomas MacMillan, Zoners Advance MLK-Amistad Sale, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Dec. 12, 2013).  In a 
statement emailed to the New Haven Independent, Renae Reese, Director of CCNE, confirmed that: 
the organizing committee members from Newhallville (called Newhallville 
Rising) approached the CT Center for a New Economy (CCNE) to be their partner 
in the process of negotiating a Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) with 
Achievement First. The reach out came because Achievement First indicated to 
Newhallville Rising that since they were an unincorporated group, Achievement 
First would not be able to sign a CBA with them but only with an incorporated 




deal-making by public officials, where participants in a decision-making process purport 
to represent a broad community, the appearance of reciprocal benefits between 
negotiating parties conveys the abandonment of independent representation for a broader 
constituency.349  Furthermore, the decision to stay out of the public eye makes scrutiny of 
the process far more difficult; if the public signatories are not the ones responsible for the 
outcome, to whom are dissatisfied citizens supposed to complain?350   
Scholar Vicki Been has observed that in part because they are private, CBAs have 
no mechanism to ensure that the signatories are representative of the impacted 
constituencies.351  The harm is particularized, however, when the CBA negotiators 
convey the patina of representativeness but the underlying reality is far different.352  If the 
CBA process is viewed by the ultimate decision makers—in this case, the Board of 
                                                
349 For example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in reviewing the practice of conditional or contract 
zoning, noted that such reciprocal bargains “[are] objectionable because [they] represent[] an abandonment 
on the part of the zoning authority of its duty to exercise independent judgment in making zoning 
decisions.”  Chrismon v. Guilford Cnty., 370 S.E.2d 579, 593 (N.C. 1988).  See also Wegner, supra note 
318. 
350 Of course, a valid response to this concern is that the CBA need not be the only private agreement 
negotiated with the developer.  Julian Gross notes that “the existence of a coalition trying to negotiate a 
CBA does not prevent other community interests or representatives from themselves making their views 
known, or even negotiating with the developer as well; there should be no official designation of certain 
groups as the only valid community representatives.”  Gross, supra note 65 at 38.  The assertion that other 
groups may simply negotiate on their own behalf, however, belies the contention that the CBA process is 
wholly representative of community interests.  If the CBA is represented by only a subset of interests, the 
negotiating coalition should be transparent that such is the case.  In addition, Gross’s contention ignores the 
collateral consequences of economic waste—i.e., the costs of developing a parallel negotiating 
infrastructure.  Furthermore, he overlooks the structural disadvantages faced by such non-represented 
groups.  If the value added by groups like CCNE and LAANE is to remedy the traditional collective action 
problems by furnishing a community organizing infrastructure, any non-represented group will be at a 
distinct advantage unless it is similarly armed with grassroots organizing capabilities.  Thus, while 
dissatisfied groups are of course at liberty to pursue their own negotiations, without the grass-roots support 
necessary to offer a tangible benefit to developers, such attempts are likely to be unsuccessful. 
351 See Been, CBAs supra note 31 at 23-24. 
352 Lance Freeman, Atlantic Yards and the Perils of Community Benefit Agreements, PLANETIZEN 
CONTRIBUTOR BLOG (May 7, 2007), online at https://www.planetizen.com/node/24335 (last visited Dec. 3, 
2013, 2009) (“If the signatories to the CBA were simply viewed as another interest group, that might be 
ok.  But the CBA is being presented as illustrative of the development’s community input.  Public officials 
are posing for pictures with the developer and signatories to the CBA, giving the impression that the 
community had significant input into the planning Atlantic Yards.  This is not necessarily the case.”); see 
Rubenstien, supra note 299. 
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Alderman—as a proxy for public planning and negotiation, the CBA might well bypass 
public mechanisms designed to ensure that no community voice is omitted from 
consideration.  And in the case of the Newhallville CBA, allegations by Rev. Newman 
that he was forcibly excluded from participating in closed-door sessions353 casts 
additional doubt on any claim that the negotiating committee was truly representative of 
community interests. 
Finally, that the absent or silent negotiators are aligned with labor’s objective of 
using CBAs to trade public support for union concessions only deepens the concerns of 
representativeness, transparency, and accountability for the ultimate outcome.  Scholar 
Benjamin Sachs has noted that the model of “tripartite” lawmaking raises the specter of 
“a politics of indirection.”354  Specifically, labor advocates, unable to alter local labor 
rules because of federal preemption, re-channel what would otherwise be direct advocacy 
into the politics of zoning and permitting.355  This raises two particular concerns—first, 
such indirection undermines the democratic foundations of civic participation.356  Second, 
the incursion of labor politics on unrelated areas of law—here, the laws associated with 
land sale and regulation—results in opaque logrolling that renders legislators less 
accountable for their horse-trading.357  
While the CBA negotiations undeniably offered a breadth of consultative 
opportunities with members of the community that exceeded those mandated by law, the 
unapologetic exclusion of apparently representative community groups (namely, the 
                                                
353 See GNHCA Dec. 11 Press Release, supra note 244.  
354 See Sachs, Despite Preemption, supra note 132 at 1207. 
355 Id.  
356 Id. at 1208. 
357 Id. at 1209 (noting that “[w]ith labor lawmaking under preemption…only one part of the legislative deal 
takes place inside the legislature, and thus only one piece of the deal is transparent to constituents.”).  
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GNHCA), along with the agenda-setting role played by labor and labor-affiliated 
organizations, casts doubt on the procedural fairness of the CBA process.  Ultimately, 
several important elements of the CBA were omitted from public record: the neutrality 
and card check agreement, the $150,000 grant commitment, and the names of influential 
negotiators with particular interests.  Whether these omissions embody a tactical decision 
by labor advocates to avoid the preemptive force of the NLRA, or simply a strategy to 
ensure the negotiating committee appeared wholly representative of the community, 
much doubt remains as to the legitimacy of both the final outcome and the process by 
which it was obtained.  This raises concerns not only of the steamrolling of the 
proprietary and dignitary interests of individual landowners, but also that no mechanisms 
currently exist to ensure the CBA matches or exceeds the procedural guarantees provided 
by a public regulatory scheme. 
 
D. Distributive Consequences – The Horizontal (In)equity of CBAs 
 
Responsible development advocates, in addition to portraying CBAs as 
procedurally superior to the standard regulatory apparatuses, also claim that CBAs offer a 
more distributively just outcome than the regulatory status quo.358  Countering the 
position that redevelopment itself is a community benefit by virtue of the additional taxes 
raised and services provided by the new project, CBA advocates highlight the 
distributional consequences that such projects might have on affected neighborhoods.359  
In many cases, this may include both residential and retail displacement (affecting low-
                                                
358 See, e.g., ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: THE POWER, PRACTICE, 
AND PROMISE OF A RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT TOOL 12 (2007) (“CBAs give a role…to community 
residents and other stakeholders and help ensure that all sectors share in the benefits as urban areas are 
redeveloped.”); BAXAMUSA, supra note 35 at 7, 157; Camacho, supra note 254 at 377.  
359 See Laura Wolf-Powers, Community Benefits Agreements in a Value Capture Context, in VALUE 
CAPTURE AND LAND POLICIES 218-19 (G.K. Ingram & Y. Hong eds. 2012). 
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income tenants and replacing higher wage jobs with low wage work), the conversion of 
public spaces, and other disruptive socio-cultural factors that may harm the 
neighborhood.360  For many CBAs, where the target development concerns a city wide 
amenity such as a stadium, an airport, or large retail complexes, developers and 
consumers may benefit substantially from the project without internalizing costs that fall 
disproportionately on the immediately affected community.361   
The redistributive aims of CBAs may be portrayed most clearly under the rubric 
of vertical equity.362  Yet the fact that CBA negotiations involve competition for benefits 
among specific interest groups raises the question of whether the CBA also promotes the 
interests of horizontal equity—that is, whether like groups are treated alike in this 
particular competition over how to allocate developer surplus once captured.363  As was 
the case with allocative efficiency, the structure of the CBA prioritizes the interests of 
constituencies who are most capable of influencing local land use decisions.364  
Extrapolating from the case of 580 Dixwell, the CBA mechanism does not guarantee a 
horizontally equitable outcome between neighbors, particularly when groups seeking to 
                                                
360 See, e.g., id. at 222, Ken Jacobs, Raising the Bar: The Hunters Point Shipyard and Candlestick Point 
Development Community Benefits Agreement, University of California, Berkeley, Center For Labor 
Research And Education Issue Brief 3-4 (2012); Cummings, supra note 30 at 67.  
361 See Wolf-Powers, supra note 359 at 219. 
362 In this way, CBAs have been analogized to exactions—a government-imposed requirement that 
developers provide funds or in-kind grants or dedications in exchange for permitting rights.  See, e.g., 
Been, CBAs supra note 31; Been, Exit supra note 273 (noting that, among other uses, “exactions may be 
used either to redistribute wealth from the developer or its customer to others, or to prevent the developer 
from appropriating wealth created by the activities of local government.  A community may impose 
exactions as a means of capturing part of the developer’s profit…. [or] a community may use exactions to 
recapture from the developer part of the value added to land by improvements financed by the 
community.”).  This paper will not undertake an assessment of the vertical equity considerations of CBAs, 
and limits its exploration to only those issues of distribution among similarly-situated parties. 
363 See id.; ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 42 at 628; Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An 
Economic and Legal Analysis, 36 YALE L.J. 385, 415 (1977) (portraying horizontal fairness as “requiring a 
person to bear a loss [when] he should be able to perceive that a general policy of refusing compensation to 
people in his situation is likely to promote the welfare of people like him in the long run.”). 
364 See supra notes 292-295 and accompanying text. 
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mitigate a project’s negative externalities compete for resources with groups seeking to 
promote redistributive aims. 
Comparing the benefits package that ultimately prevailed with the package 
proposed by the GNHCA helps illustrate this conflict.  The GNHCA proposal dealt 
almost exclusively with externality mitigation: privacy fences, time limitations related to 
lighting and noise, a residential permit parking system, garbage cans, and the like.  In 
contrast, the prevailing package contained no mitigation benefits (with the exception of 
the provision requiring Achievement First to build a mural to honor the civil rights 
leaders portrayed on the original building).  Ultimately, the latter set of interests won out, 
and despite public excoriation by Reverend Newman, the GNHCA elected not to push its 
agenda once the CBA had been signed.365   
Fundamentally, the CBA as an instrument is normatively agnostic: the particular 
benefits that may be requested during a given negotiation will likely reflect the 
composition of the organizations advocating for its passage.  I have argued, of course, 
that labor interests tend to predominate the landscape of current CBAs—and that their 
advantages as a form of “tripartite lawmaking” that escapes the preemptive force of 
federal labor law motivate their use by labor advocates nation-wide.  But labor need not 
be the driving interest motivating the formation of a community coalition.  However, 
because CBAs are valuable only when they can assure the developer of either (a) vocal 
community support, or (b) substantial forbearance from a potentially vocal opponent, 
when interests compete over the precise composition of benefits, the group that can 
assure the broadest support will be most attractive to the developer.  Furthermore, 
whichever interest group has a mobilization advantage—as is often the case with labor 
                                                
365 Interview with Rev. Newman, supra note 226. 
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interests that possess community-organizing infrastructure—may be more likely to 
prevail in such a competition.  
This problem is easily illustrated by imagining a developer who comes to the 
table with a budget of $100,000 to spend on community benefits.366  Three different 
interests groups propose three different benefits packages that are priced equally at 
$50,000.  Package “A” consists of labor-related conditions, such as wage floors and 
neutrality and card check agreements.  Package “B” consists of redistributive benefits, 
such as affordable housing guarantees and grant commitments to local youth 
organizations.  Package C consists of nuisance-reduction measures, such as those 
described by the GNHCA’s proposed benefits package.  If, as discussed above, the 
interests backing Package “A” make clear that their package is non-negotiable,367 the 
coalition will be forced to choose between packages “B” and “C”.  Under the structural 
incentives of the CBA, the developer will prefer whichever package will guarantee the 
most support.  If the interests behind Package “A” control the mobilizing and organizing 
infrastructure, they have the capacity to direct the process by which “B” is selected over 
“C” or vice versa.  Fundamentally, “B” and “C” are interchangeable, and the give and 
take of the negotiation process will determine which group prevails. 
A wrinkle arises when considering whether package A, B, or C in isolation would 
be permitted under the alternative land use regulatory process.  Under this lens, Package 
“A” is impermissible under federal labor law.368  Package B would potentially fail under 
the Supreme Court’s Nollan/Dolan jurisprudence for ensuring exactions are calibrated to 
                                                
366 The hypothetical assumes that the $100,000 budget represents the threshold at which the developer’s 
surplus becomes too small to justify the investment.   
367 See supra Part IV.C.3. 
368 See supra Part IV.C.2.  
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offset development impacts.369  Package C, however, would likely fall comfortably 
within the zone of permissible conditions that may be imposed upon developers in 
exchange for permitting rights.  These observations are not meant to suggest that any 
particular set of these benefits is more or less normatively superior based on their 
compliance (or lack thereof) with existing law.   
However, to the extent that Package “C” proponents are unable to secure benefits 
that would likely be granted under the current regulatory regime, the results are 
inequitable.  Under the current rules, there are few rights to redistributive benefits, but 
numerous rights possessed associated with mitigating the negative externalities of 
development.  Thus, a CBA may promote horizontal inequity when non-rights holders 
obtain benefits at the expense of individuals who, in fact, have a right to compensation 
under the current allocation of property rules.   
Horizontal equity may also be examined from the perspective of the developer, 
and under this rubric the mechanism appears quite fair. Here, too, the CBA proves to be 
normatively agnostic: CBA proponents have not identified “appropriate” and 
“inappropriate” targets of CBAs.  Rather, they seek specific outcomes, regardless of the 
identity of the developer.  That Achievement First was targeted suggests that CBAs do, in 
fact, treat all developers alike, and do not discriminate on the basis of corporate structure, 
motive, or service provided.370  Of course, the tool is flexible, and thus the identity of the 
developer may, play a role in determining whether a CBA is sought in the first place.  
Charter school detractors, for instance, may view the CBA as offering the collateral 
                                                
369 See supra note 287 and accompanying text.  
370 The Yale-New Haven Cancer Center CBA also supports the idea that CBA advocates seek particular 
outcomes—such as wage minimums, community contributions, or labor agreements—rather than targeting 
the identity of the developer.  
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advantage of placing an additional tax on independent charters.  But without analyzing 
the data to see whether patterns of identity-motivated action does, in fact, occur, such 
motives are at this stage speculative at best.  
 
 
E. A Coda: on Politics and Land Use Regulation in a Union City 
 
Although helpful as an analytic framework, the normative evaluations discussed 
above come into sharper relief when presented against the backdrop of New Haven’s 
current political landscape.  The current alignment of interests between the politically-
dominant UNITE-HERE Locals 34 and 35, the union-backed members of New Haven’s 
Board of Aldermen, and the union-supported Mayor elect, Toni Harp, reflects a 
dramatically different political landscape for New Haven that may further undermine the 
purported participatory benefits of CBAs.371   
A decade earlier, New Haven mayoral and aldermanic politics were fluid and 
dynamic, requiring alliances between key members of New Haven’s socio-cultural sub-
communities.  John DeStefano, serving as Mayor for twenty years beginning in 1994, 
formed bonds with key power brokers like Rev. Boise Kimber, an influential leader and 
clergyman within the black community372 and the Fuscos, a wealthy family within the 
Italian community.373  And as CCNE founder and union organizer Andrea van den 
Heever discovered, politics in 1990s New Haven required broad-based coalitions that 
were able to garner support from the powerful—but stratified—leadership of disparate 
communities within the city.  Justice Alito, in his concurrence in the firefighters’ 
                                                
371 See Mary O’Leary, Toni Harp Winner in New Haven Mayoral Race, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Nov. 5, 
2013); Mary O’Leary, Labor Unions Back Toni Harp for New Haven Mayor, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (June 
14, 2013); Meyerson, supra note 229. 
372 See Paul Bass, Was He the Culprit? NEW HAVEN INDEP. (June 29, 2009). 
373 See Josef Goodman & Jacob Wolf-Sorokin, Master of the City, THE POLITIC (Apr. 23, 2013).  
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discrimination case, Ricci v. DeStafano,374 went so far as to highlight Kimber’s role as “a 
politically powerful New Haven pastor and a self-professed ‘kingmaker.’”375   
By 2011, the scales had shifted dramatically.  Dissatisfied with the comfortable 
relationship between the Board and the mayor’s office, union leaders funded challengers 
in fifteen different aldermanic seats, winning a veto-proof supermajority that allowed the 
Board to play a more aggressive role in setting the political agenda for New Haven.376   
Comparing the negotiations surrounding the Omni Hotel Development 
Agreement377 and the Yale-New Haven Hospital CBA378 with the negotiations over the 
Newhallville CBA, it seems clear that the nature of development-oriented, coalition-
based advocacy has changed.  In the case of the former, to build momentum for their 
advocacy platform, the unions required the assistance of a broad range of community 
groups, including the black clergy, civil rights and housing advocates, and other social 
justice organizations.  The political quid pro quos offered mutual benefit and encouraged 
a broad-based, participatory process. 
But CCNE and its funders have played the long game, cultivating a deep set of 
community ties that have since obviated the need to involve other purported power-
brokers in city politics.  The alleged steamrolling of GNHCA by CCNE over the 580 
Dixwell negotiations revealed the limited value CCNE placed on securing the support of 
the black clergy.   
With a veto-proof supermajority on the Board, the need for logrolling diminishes 
along with the need to maintain a broad set of alliances to advance a particular interest 
                                                
374 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
375 Id. at 598 (Alito, J., concurring). 
376 See Matthew Lloyd-Thomas, New Force Aims to Counter Unions, YALE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 6, 2013). 
377 See supra note 123. 
378 See supra notes 130-145 and accompanying text. 
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group’s political agenda.  As demonstrated by Alderwoman Brenda Foskey-Cyrus’s last-
minute decision to send the agreement back to the Community Development 
Committee—allowing a last-minute, closed-door session to iron out the contours of the 
CBA—the current political leaders are able to set the priorities and terms of these 
negotiations as they see fit.379  In the case of this union city, therefore, the chance that the 




The Newhallville-Amistad deal is but one iteration of a community benefits 
agreement, negotiated in a very specific political and historical context.  As this paper has 
discussed, CBAs may take many forms—whether public or private, singular or multiple, 
transparent or opaque.  There are, at present, few limitations or guidelines for 
determining how and under what circumstances CBAs should be used to supplement or 
circumvent the existing system of land use controls in any particular locality.   
This dynamism is one of the chief virtues of the CBA, for it helps to erase the 
clear, but often arbitrary, lines determining what categories of benefits a locality may 
demand as a condition of granting development rights.  And as CBA advocates have 
clearly articulated, the tool helps disrupt entrenched power dynamics in existing 
mechanisms of urban governance, giving greater power and control to disadvantaged 
classes of individuals who are often unable to make land use law work to their benefit.  
But the salubrious effects of this instrument should not be overemphasized in 
order to obscure the risks that CBA bargaining—unconstrained by judicial or 
                                                
379 Of course, politics are notoriously unstable.  A backlash to the union supermajority has taken shape in 
the form of “Take Back New Haven,” a slate of democratic candidates aiming to challenge the new 
machine politics that have taken over New Haven since 2011.  See, e.g., Paul Bass, New Slate Targets 
Labor “Machine”, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (June 30, 2013).    
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administrative review—may pose.  A close look into the negotiating process underlying 
the Newhallville-Amistad CBA illuminates many of the concerns raised by land use 
scholars who remain cautious, albeit optimistic, about the potential this tool holds for 
future development projects.  Because there are, at present, no legal mechanisms to 
scrutinize the process, the negotiations are prone to risk of capture by powerful interest 
groups.  And I have placed great emphasis in this paper on the role that organized labor 
plays in biasing not only the content of the benefits themselves but also the structure the 
agreements take.380    
As a result, the commendable goals of transparency, inclusiveness, and equity 
may be lost in service of particular pre-determined outcomes.  When the needs of these 
powerful interests can motivate a developer to meet the needs of the broader community, 
so much the better.  But such a claim, I believe, raises more questions than it answers.  
Who, in fact, constitutes the relevant “community”?  Should all members be entitled to 
share in the developer’s surplus?  Recognizing that resources are limited, which members 
of this community should be given priority over others if there is a conflict?  And, finally, 
who should decide?  
Because they are so new, localities are only beginning to grapple with how to 
manage these instruments.  Some have argued for regulation, asking cities to re-exert 
control over the freewheeling negotiations of wholly private dealmaking.381  But by re-
inserting government into the process, such regulation may well undermine the efficiency 
                                                
380 Whether or not this is true, empirically, remains an open question.  Any answers may help further our 
understanding of whether CBAs have vitality independent of these interests.   
381 See, e.g., Michael A. Cardozo, Reflections on the 1989 Charter Revisions, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 85, 
93 (2014) (suggesting that the New York City Charter Revision Commission might consider demanding all 
CBAs be incorporated into existing formal structures like the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure 
(ULURP), regulating their subject matter, or limiting the participation of city officials in their public 
capacities); David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 Yale L.J. 1670, 1707 (2013) (describing efforts in 
New York to solicit input by advisory neighborhood bodies as part of the ULURP process). 
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gains that this flexible tool provides.  Others have suggested taking advantage of the free-
market, using freedom of contract to insure the integrity of the process by way of a CBA 
“operating agreement.”382  Recourse to neoliberal correctives may help mitigate the 
current shortfalls of this mechanism, but there is no way to guarantee that such best 
practices will always be followed.  Finally, some have advocated for eliminating the 
ability of land use decision makers to consider CBAs in reaching their decisions, even if 
an outright ban on CBAs is impractical.383   
At a minimum, the emergent popularity of these instruments should suggest 
discomfort with the existing regulatory regime.  And it may well be that innovations in 
our current methods of land use controls may offer the best solution for addressing the 
concerns of disadvantaged groups without the concurrent risks that land use law has long 
sought to mitigate.  
                                                
382 See Marcello, supra note 67 at 663-64 (discussing the example of a CBA in New Orleans whereby 
coalition members, by executing an operating agreement, agreed to be bound to specific principles that 
minimized conflicts of interest, reduced the chance for side-deals, and a guarantee of transparency). 
383 New York City Bar Association, The Role of Community Benefit Agreements in New York City’s Land 
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580 Dixwell Land Disposition Agreement, Exhibit B (Community Benefits Agreement) 
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